Epstein Secrets

r goal of "exporting the Islamic revolution" would not succeed. No doubt that Arafat's close ties with Saddam Hussein, a nemesis of both Assad and Khomeini, and his concession to recognize Israel also widened the chasm between the PLO and the Islamic Republic. From Assad's standpoint, Arafat's relation

kets. However, since it also heavily relies on Caspian hydrocarbon imports and earns an estimated $200 million per annum on BTC transit fees alone, Ankara has little interest in having EFTA00630309 Azerbaijan invite retaliation on its energy sector. Moscow, the region's preeminent power, continues t

that appears under the eye-catching headline, "The Man Who Broke the Middle East." The man in question is not Sykes or Picot or Nasser or Saddam or Khomeini or George W. Bush or Noun al-Maliki, but Barack Obama. I often agree with Elliott, but I could not let this one go by without a response. Don't wor

Kashmeri 24 June 2014 -- Baghdad is 900 miles from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; 500 miles from Amman, Jordan; 300 miles from Kuwait, and 1000 miles from Ankara, Turkey, countries that are allies of the United States, and armed to the teeth with American weapons. With over 700,000 soldiers, 6000 tanks, EFTA

in the last years of the shah manifested a striving for local hegemony that transcended the country's strongest alliances with the U.S. and Israel. Khomeini's regime went on to reveal how even messianic ideologies can bow to long-established imperatives and dramatically different security environments.

her rallied Syrian Kurds behind him by arming the Kurdish rebellion movement in Turkey. But that assistance subsided with warming relations between Ankara EFTA_R1_00225768 EFTA01840712 and Damascus in recent years. In the meantime, the region is looking much less hospitable to Turkey than it did t

nctions, corruption and mismanagement, oil exports are down by almost a half and production is nearing twenty year lows. Before the late Ayatollah Khomeini announced that "economics is for donkeys" Iran's oil production stood at close to six million barrels per day. Today, after thirty- two years of "th

g, if and when it comes, may involve Turkey and Iran. Turkey wants to replace the entire regime structure; Iran wants the opposite. That's why both Ankara and Tehran will need to compromise, identifying high-ranking Syrians, probably military, who will protect each country's interests and upon whom a

r goal of "exporting the Islamic revolution" would not succeed. No doubt that Arafat's close ties with Saddam Hussein, a nemesis of both Assad and Khomeini, and his concession to recognize Israel also widened the chasm between the PLO and the Islamic Republic. From Assad's standpoint, Arafat's relatio

ets. However, since it also heavily relies on Caspian hydrocarbon imports and earns an estimated $200 million per annum on BTC transit fees alone, Ankara has little interest in having Azerbaijan invite retaliation on its energy sector. Moscow, the region's preeminent power, continues to view the Casp

onversely, views the world as essentially hostile, and many hardliners argue for a national security policy based on the most atavistic elements of Khomeini's worldview: international institutions and diplomacy are symptoms of an inequitable world, and a farce — self-reliance is the only option. And if

ned that trend." For years,Turkey had been forced to wait at Europe's gate, but now the country has found a new self-confidence. The government in Ankara has said that EU membership remains a EFTA_R1_00298540 EFTA01884059 long-term goal, but that it won't come at any price. "We still believe that