Epstein Secrets

he use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from using a defendant's voluntary statements in a subsequent criminal

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

he use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from using a defendant's voluntary statements in a subsequent criminal

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

he use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from using a defendant's voluntary statements in a subsequent criminal

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

he use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from using a defendant's voluntary statements in a subsequent criminal

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

he use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit the Government from using a defendant's voluntary statements in a subsequent criminal

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

008) (finding that where classified information presented at trial, if disclosed, would jeopardize national security weighed against public access); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (existence of confidentiality order alone did not defeat presumption of public access); Hanf

the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of that sharing."), "with shame and embarrassment," see Perlman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 312 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2002), vacated and remanded, 541 U.S. 970, 124 S.Ct. 1874, 158 L.Ed.2d 464 (2004), aff'd, 380 F