Epstein Secrets

n, 466 So.2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); and Doherty v. John Doe No. 22, 957 So.2d 1267 (4th DCA 2007)

inion which predated the adoption of section 23, the First District aptly characterized the nature of this right.

." See endnote 2 for full text of §39.204, Fla. Stat.2 (,-r's Motion, p. 8-9). See Carson v. Jackson, 466 So.2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); and Doherty v. John Doe No. 22, 957 So.2d 1267 (4th DCA 2007). A reading of these cases establishes that §39.204 does not provide Plaintiff with a carte blanc

privacy unless the intrusion is warranted by the necessity of a compelling state interest. In an opinion which predated the adoption of section 23, the First District aptly characterized the nature of this right. A fundamental aspect of personhood's integrity is the power to control what we shall reveal about ou

04." See endnote 2 for full text of §39.204, Fla. Stat.2 (¶'s Motion, p. 8-9). See Carson v. Jackson, 466 So.2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); and Doherty v. John Doe No. 22, 957 So.2d 1267 (4th DCA 2007). A reading of these cases establishes that §39.204 does not provide Plaintiff with a carte blanche

privacy unless the intrusion is warranted by the necessity of a compelling state interest. In an opinion which predated the adoption of section 23, the First District aptly characterized the nature of this right. A fundamental aspect of personhood's integrity is the power to control what we shall reveal about ou