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ns with America's closest ally in the region and achieved nothing whatsoever in the "peace process." The end result in the summer of 2014 is to see the Palestinian Authority turn to a deal with Hamas for new elections that—if they are held, which admittedly is unlikely—would usher the terrorist group into a power- shari
e Saudis' worst fears about lingering EFTA00665425 instability in Iraq. The Obama administration will find it difficult not to come to the aid of Maliki, especially given the presence of large numbers of Al Qaeda fighters fighting in the open. The Saudis want nothing to do with Maliki and blame him
nto a bitter public feud. It was prompted an agreement reached last week in Qatar between the head of Hamas' political bureau, Khaled Meshaal, and the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas. According to the deal, Abbas would take on the additional role of prime minister until elections are held later this year
e been supporting opposing camps. Since Iraq's first democratic elections in 2005, Iran has supported the Shiite-backed Dawa party of Nun Kamal al- Maliki, while Turkey has backed the secular pan-Iraqi movement of Ayad Allawi. Following months of contention after the 2010 elections, Maliki formed a go
overreach as contributing to Sunni radicalism, unity, and pushback. For instance, they see the recent entry of Hamas into a unity government with the Palestinian Authority as the loss of a strong, radical, but Sunni regional ally. And it doesn't stop there. As Saeed Leylaz, an Iranian analyst cited by the Journal, re
ing place in the Iranian establishment over whether its regional policies—backing Shi'a and Shi'a-friendly forces like Hezbollah and the Assad and Maliki governments to the hilt in brutal civil wars-is working. According to The Wall Street Journal, Iranian doves are pointing to the recent regional ch
excluded from the government. By going further than the Israeli government — by seeming to justify an Israeli refusal even to begin negotiations with the Palestinian Authority until Hamas accepts those conditions or the Palestinian Authority rejects Hamas — the President has made it harder for the Netanyahu government to re
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030273 →t collapse soon, if not through street power, then perhaps through the shattering of the delicate balance in the upper echelons of Baghdad. Last week Maliki hinted that he may resign and call new elections, just five months after forming his second cabinet. Two months ago, large and angry demonstrations b
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030279 →collapses, makes Israeli concessions or new flexibility in the West Bank impossible and puts paid to the entire "peace process." It brings Hamas into the Palestinian Authority government, ending a period of several years when Palestinian Security Forces have cooperated with the Israel Defense Forces against terrorism and ag
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031836 →under the auspices of the six-country Gulf Cooperation Council. In Iraq, the Saudi government will continue to pursue a hard-line stance against the Maliki government, which it regards as little more than an Iranian puppet. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia will act to check the growth of Hezbollah and to ensure
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031846 →Entities connected to both the Palestinian Authority and Maliki

Barack Obama
PERSON
Benjamin Netanyahu
PERSON
Jerusalem
LOCATION
George W. Bush
PERSON
United States
LOCATION
Lebanon
LOCATION
Bashar al-Assad
PERSON
Cairo
LOCATION
Tehran
LOCATION
Bill Clinton
PERSON
Hillary Clinton
PERSON
Marc Rich
PERSON
Mahmoud Abbas
PERSON
West Bank
LOCATION
Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
Middle East
LOCATION
Saddam Hussein
PERSON
Fatah
ORGANIZATION
Damascus
LOCATION
Hosni Mubarak
PERSON