Epstein Secrets

-02 at 58016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley v. U.S„ 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009) ("[A] sponsor's statement to the full Senate carries considerable weight").4 There is no basis to depar

application of §2255 for appeal. See C.MA. v. Epstein, Case No. 08-CIV-80811 Marra/Johnson; and Jane Doe II v. Epstein, Case No. 09-CW-80489 Marra/Johnson. EFTA00207698 Case 9:08-cv-80893-KAM Document 128 Entered on FLSD Docket 03 05 2010 Page 23 of 36 Jane Doe v. Epstein Case No. 08-CV-80893-Marra

-02 at 88016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley v, U.S. 129 -5- EFTA00212897 Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 of 36 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009)

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

-02 at 88016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley v, U.S. 129 -5- EFTA00212964 Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 of 36 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009)

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

-02 at 88016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley v, U.S. 129 -5- EFTA00221367 Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 of 36 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009)

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

-02 at 88016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley v, U.S. 129 -5- EFTA00221464 Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 of 36 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009)

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

-02 at 88016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley v, U.S. 129 -5- EFTA00189753 Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 of 36 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009)

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

-02 at 58016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley'. U.S. 129 -5- Cast No. 08.80736-CV-MARRA P-011846 EFTA00192892 Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 o

R THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JANE DOE No. 101, Plaintiff, VS. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 09 - 8059 1 Civil Action No. CIV-MARRP MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHNSON Etrpy ,fir DC INTAKE APR 1 7 2009 STEVEN M. LARIMORE CLERK U.S. OIST. CT. S.O. OF FLA. MIAMI COMPLAINT AND Defendant. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIA

mless" is an odd statutory interpretation. The Majority's faulty interpretation actually makes this part of the venue provision superfluous. See ?. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) ("[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that a statu

interpret subsection (a)(8)'s general right to fair treatment by reference to the subsections (and their constituent rights) that precede it. See, Johnson it United States,559 U.S. 133, 139,130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) ("Ultimately, context determines meaning ...."); Pi Gutierrez v. Ada, 528