Epstein Secrets

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that "[n]othing in t

Courts tread lightly where prosecutorial discretion is concerned because "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 203, 203 n.648 (2006). "Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's g

dily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 94 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions [13] about whom to prosecute be

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that In]othing in this chapter shall be construed to im

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to assessing the s

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "(T]he Government retains `broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that Irdothing in this chapter shall be construed to im

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[lin addition to assessing the s

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains `broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that InJothing in this chapter shall be construed to imp

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to assessing the s

is constitutional responsibility to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'" United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. Untied States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547). This broad discretion rests largely on

urts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.598, 607-08 (1985). See also Town of-Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) ("[C]ourts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are