Epstein Secrets

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that "[n]othing in t

Courts tread lightly where prosecutorial discretion is concerned because "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 203, 203 n.648 (2006). "Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's g

"it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain r 161 degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a part

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that In]othing in this chapter shall be construed to im

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents an

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "(T]he Government retains `broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that Irdothing in this chapter shall be construed to im

that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents an

6) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction"); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (the decision whether to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited to judicial review," and "not readily

litigation.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). The work-product doctrine applies in civil and criminal litigation. Id. at 236. In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court described the policy behind the doctrine protecting the opinion work-product of lawyers. The Court explained that a lawyer is bou

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains `broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that InJothing in this chapter shall be construed to imp

that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents an