Epstein Secrets

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

prosecuted. In American jurisprudence, "a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R.S. v. Richard D. 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Simply put, Epstein's state plea under the NPA could not extinguish any victim's right to prosecution since

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

prosecuted. In American jurisprudence, "a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R.S. v. Richard D. 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Simply put, Epstein's state plea under the NPA could not extinguish any victim's right to prosecution since

e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1996) (examining the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on racially- motivated charging); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding due process bars prosecution in retaliation for exercising fundamental rights); Kolender v. Lawso

tizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another"); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 84 (1981) (extending Linda R.S. to hold that private citizens have "no cognizable interest" in process by which magistrates decide whether to issue warrants on criminal complaints);