Epstein Secrets

president and prime minister, as an innovative breakthrough, a reversal of the strategy of their unwholesome predecessor, PLO chairman (1969-2004) Yasser Arafat. This is incorrect. Indeed, Arafat's strategy from the late 1980s, after he realized that he wasn't going to orchestrate the destruction of Israel

tive breakthrough, a reversal of the strategy of their unwholesome predecessor, PLO chairman (1969-2004) Yasser Arafat. This is incorrect. Indeed, Arafat's strategy from the late 1980s, after he realized that he wasn't going to orchestrate the destruction of Israel (Black September 1970 in Jordan and

at the UN General Assembly. Many observers in the West seem to regard this campaign, masterminded by Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad, respectively the Palestinian Authority's president and prime minister, as an innovative breakthrough, a reversal of the strategy of their unwholesome predecessor, PLO chairman (1969-2004)

nth year in office, has never been known for the kind of political brinksmanship that characterized the rule of his predecessor, PLO leader Yassir Arafat. And yet, recent months have seen Abbas's government make a pair of deeply provocative moves, with potentially catastrophic consequences for Palest

exceedingly risky gamble. The idea is bound to get a sympathetic hearing at the United Nations General Assembly, where the so-called "Arab bloc" of the Palestinian Authority's Middle Eastern allies has a considerable voice, when it convenes this September. But it is highly unlikely to pass muster with the Security Council

nth year in office, has never been known for the kind of political brinksmanship that characterized the rule of his predecessor, PLO leader Yassir Arafat. And yet, recent months have seen Abbas's government make a pair of deeply provocative moves, with potentially catastrophic consequences for Palest

exceedingly risky gamble. The idea is bound to get a sympathetic hearing at the United Nations General Assembly, where the so-called "Arab bloc" of the Palestinian Authority's Middle Eastern allies has a considerable voice, when it convenes this September. But it is highly unlikely to pass muster with the Security Council

O leaders to achieve peace agreements. It has multiplied the number of settlements since the 1993 Oslo accords tenfold. Even after they got rid of Arafat, Israel has given nothing. Now Lieberman wants to get rid of Abu Mazen, president of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas has decided to defend the rig

mber of unintended consequences have already emerged, ranging from the boosting of Hamas' prominence, undermining its isolation, further weakening the Palestinian Authority's Mahmoud Abbas, and diverting regional attention from Syria. Fundamentally, the operation — an outgrowth of a rapid escalation of the past year's e