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ay not be especially reassuring. "The connections between the opposition and the Free Syrian Army are still tenuous, but they're getting better," a State Department official told McClatchy. "If we can get Assad and his cronies out, that will at least create an atmosphere to have a dialogue. That can't happen no
sustainable outcomes, of course, but they could map the outlines of a next phase of warfare after Assad loses control of the Syrian state. But the Alawites aren't the only breakup threat. The consensus among Syria's Kurdish political factions, encouraged by Iraqi Kurd leader Massoud Barzani, who has ho
e Assad clan, and the country's majority of Sunni Muslims. That's why the opposite of the Assad dictatorship could be the breakup of Syria — as the Alawites retreat to their coastal redoubt — and a permanent civil war. There are two things that could divert us from that outcome. One is the Iraq alterna
Persian Gulf nations and coordinated in part by the United States, according to opposition activists and U.S. and foreign officials." The next day, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland clarified that the administration had no intention of arming the rebels. As for coordinating arms shipments, presumably
sition, rather than Assad's forces, that was responsible for the massacre at Houla. On this reading, it wasn't Sunnis who were killed en masse, but Alawites and other minorities. The facts are otherwise. As this list of casualties from the Houla killings shows, the dead were Sunnis, with the majority of
cluding elements of al Qaeda. Subsequently, there's worry that the Sunnis will target the Christian community and take their vengeance against the Alawites, from whom the ruling Assad regime is drawn. The idea then, EFTA00712537 now corroborated by this Syrian disinformation campaign, is that the opp
nctions, the proper environment now exists for diplomacy to work. The next few months will determine whether it succeeds. Dennis B. Ross, a former State Department and National Security Council official, was a special assistant to President Obama for the Middle East, Afghanistan and South Asia from 2009 to 20
he rebellion stop and the sectarian aspirations — the raw desire by Syria's Sunni majority to oust the Alawite minority — begin. As a result, most Alawites are rallying to Assad, as are some Sunnis who have benefitted from his regime, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus, the capital. These pro-regime A
authority, having seized further powers before the presidential election in June. After the meeting, which lasted a little over an hour, a senior State Department official said Field Marshal Tantawi and Mrs. Clinton had discussed the economy, regional security, "the political transition" and the military's "o
closer integration with the West via European Union membership; and it was more vocally supportive of the rights of religious minorities, such as Alawites and Christians. Still, though more cosmopolitan than the Welfare Party, the AKP retained enough of an Islamic flavor to make religious Turks feel t
Entities connected to both State Department and Alawites

Barack Obama
PERSON
Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
United States
LOCATION
Department of Justice
ORGANIZATION
George W. Bush
PERSON
Bill Clinton
PERSON
Bashar al-Assad
PERSON
Tehran
LOCATION
Benjamin Netanyahu
PERSON
Joe Biden
PERSON
Marc Rich
PERSON
Lebanon
LOCATION
Vladimir Putin
PERSON
Saddam Hussein
PERSON
Hillary Clinton
PERSON
Virginia Giuffre
PERSON
Prince Andrew
PERSON
Bloomberg L.P.
ORGANIZATION
Damascus
LOCATION
Middle East
LOCATION