Epstein Secrets

Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (citing Torres, 901 F.2d at 233-34; Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); see also, e.g., United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("A bill of particulars is not a general investigative tool, a discovery device or a means to compel the

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

r. 2019) 154 United States v. Cromitie, et al., 09 Cr. 558 (CM) 286 United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) 75 United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 268 United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) passim United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

r. 2019) 154 United States v. Cromitie, et al., 09 Cr. 558 (CM) 286 United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) 75 United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 268 United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) passim United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

) 40, 41 United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2019) 106 United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) 52 United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 176 United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) 78, 81, 103 United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr

nited States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jeffiies, 405 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2005). Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (citing Tomes, 901 F.2d at 233-34; Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); see also, e.g., United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("A bill of particulars is not a general investigative tool, a discovery device or a means to compel the

und the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that "the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant." Id. at 156

. 2019) 154 United States v. Cromitie, et al., 09 Cr. 558 (CM) 286 United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) 75 United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 268 United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) passim United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585

rcuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr