Epstein Secrets

ought up the possibility of firing everybody. Should I fire Bannon? Should I fire Reince? Should I fire McMaster? Should I fire Spicer? Should I fire Tillerson? This ritual was, everyone understood, more a pretext to a discussion of the power he held than it was, strictly, about personnel decisions. Still, i

dy with foreign policy stature and an international network had been put in HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020053 place—even the new secretary of state designate, Rex Tillerson, had no real experience in foreign policy. To bewildered foreign secretaries, it seemed logical to see the presidentelect’s son-in-law as a figure of

dence, believing that he had). And so it was with Director Comey. In their several meetings since he took office—

ni. He believed they would both perform kamikaze acts for him—yjust as everyone else knew they would almost certainly never be confirmed. OOK Ok As James Comey’s testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee approached—it would take place on June 8, twelve days after the presidential traveling party retur

ng investigation and is classified I cannot say more about what we are doing and whose conduct we are examining. He had, however, said quite enough. Comey converted rumor, leaks, theory, innuendo, and pundit hot air—and until this moment that was all there was, at best the hope of a scandal—into a forma

us impressions of the man, agreed to sign on. Jim Mattis, a retired four-star general, one of the most respected commanders in the U.S. armed forces; Rex Tillerson, CEO of ExxonMobil; Scott Pruitt and Betsy De Vos, Jeb Bush loyalists—all of them were now focused on the singular fact that while he might be a pecu

every cabinet member for the next seven days through their confirmation hearings,” he said of the business-and-military 1950s-type cabinet choices. “Tillerson is two days, Session is two days, Mattis is two days... .” Bannon veered from “Mad Dog” Mattis—the retired four-star general whom Trump had nominate

RVANKA 6. AT HOME 7. RUSSIA 8. ORG CHART 9. CPAC 10. GOLDMAN 11. WIRETAP 12. REPEAL AND REPLACE 13. BANNON AGONISTES 14. SITUATION ROOM 15. MEDIA 16. COMEY 17. ABROAD AND AT HOME 18. BANNON REDUX 19. MIKA WHO? 20. MCMASTER AND SCARAMUCCI 21. BANNON AND SCARAMUCCI HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019879 22. GENERAL KEL

urvived the release of the Billy Bush tape when, in the uproar that followed, the RNC had had the gall to pressure him to quit the race. FBI director James Comey, having bizarrely hung Hillary out to dry by saying he was reopening the investigation into her emails eleven days before the election, had helped av

USE_OVERSIGHT_020114 president’s part. The daily discussion among senior staffers, those still there and those now gone—all of whom had written off Tillerson’s future in the Trump administration—was how long General Kelly would last as chief of staff. There was something of a virtual office pool, and the j

believed that the sole upside of being part of the Trump White House was to help prevent worse from happening. In early October, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s fate was sealed—if his obvious ambivalence toward the president had not already sealed it—by the revelation that he had called the president “a fucki

ge Bannon’s ouster by McMaster’s hand from the NSC. With the president promising that he would make up his mind by August, and McMaster, Mattis, and Tillerson pressing for a decision as soon as possible, Bannon- inspired media began a campaign to brand McMaster as a globalist, interventionist, and all aroun

fend Sessions, and who believed that he had militantly— indeed with scathing attacks on the Jarvankas for their stupidity—walled himself off from the Comey smashup, was now suddenly getting calls from reporters with leaks that painted him as an engaged participant in the Comey decision. In a furious pho

r had urged the ouster of many of them), any of whom might testify against him. In March alone, Gary Cohn, the president's chief economic adviser, Rex Tillerson, the secretary of state, and Andrew McCabe, the deputy director of the FBI—each man bearing the president deep contempt— were pushed from the admini

ical question. He insisted on an answer, and affirmative one: "Mr. President, you're not a target?' Early in his tenu Trump had pushed FBI director James Comey to provide precisely tl reassurance. In one of the signature moves of his presidency, he had fir Comey in May 2017 in part because he wasn't satisf

es of his presidency, he had fir Comey in May 2017 in part because he wasn't satisfied with the enth siasm of the affirmation and therefore assumed Comey was plotti against him. Whether the president was indeed a target—and it would surely he taken a through-the-looking-glass exercise not to see him

es Secretary Tom Price was forced to resign in September 2017 due to excessive use of private charter jets and military aircraft, and Trump replaced Tillerson as Secretary of State with Mike Pompeo in March 2018 over disagreements on foreign policy.1446X43n In 2018, EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt and Inte

cceeded by Mick Mulvaney as acting chief of staff; he was replaced in March 2020 by Mark Meadows.[44c4 On May 9, 2017, Trump dismissed FBI director James Comey. While initially attributing this action to Comey's conduct in the investigation about Hillary Clinton's emails, Trump said a few days later that h

s replaced in March 2020 by Mark Meadows.[44c4 On May 9, 2017, Trump dismissed FBI director James Comey. While initially attributing this action to Comey's conduct in the investigation about Hillary Clinton's emails, Trump said a few days later that he was concerned with Comey's roles in the ongoing T

appointees who have spoken critically, to varying degrees, about the president after leaving his employ. This includes, among others, John Bolton, Rex Tillerson, John Kelly, Tom Bossert, Fiona Hill and Gary Cohn. -- Spencer took the sting out of this punch by vigorously denying well-sourced press reports on

had lost confidence in the bureau's director, B. Comey, was a 'slip of the tongue' that was not based o

appointees who have spoken critically, to varying degrees, about the president after leaving his employ. This includes, among others, John Bolton, Rex Tillerson, John Kelly, Tom Bossert, Fiona Hill and Gary Cohn. -- Spencer took the sting out of this punch by vigorously denying well-sourced press reports o

ad lost confidence in the bureau's director, B. Comey, was a 'slip of the tongue' that was not based on

orical question. He insisted on an answer, and affirmative one: “Mr. President, you're not a target.” Early in his tenu Trump had pushed FBI director James Comey to provide precisely tl reassurance. In one of the signature moves of his presidency, he had fir Comey in May 2017 in part because he wasn't satisfie

n his tenu Trump had pushed FBI director James Comey to provide precisely tl reassurance. In one of the signature moves of his presidency, he had fir Comey in May 2017 in part because he wasn't satisfied with the enth siasm of the affirmation and therefore assumed Comey was plotti against him. Whether t

hner had urged the ouster of many of them), any of whom might testify against him. In March alone, Gary Cohn, the president's chief economic adviser, Rex Tillerson, the secretary of state, and Andrew McCabe, the deputy director of the FBI—each man bearing the president deep contempt— were pushed from the adminis