Epstein Secrets

s Prophet"? Or, alternatively, will we look back and see photos of Saudi anti-riot vehicles cruising across the causeway to support the crushing of Bahrain's "Arab spring" moment as the most consequential image of the past 18 months? The reality is that that the "Arab spring" -- a misnomer of olympian

all could advance its geopolitical interests. Explaining Israel's Reluctance Even if the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would not take power in a post- Assad Syria, or even if it would not change Syrian foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine once empowered, Israel may have national interests in Assad stayin

which will give n=w impetus to solidify and unify the opposition. Yemen is equally unpredictable. Jordan and Kuwait are shaky and face uncert=inty. Bahrain seems slowly to cope adequately with its issues. Lebanon is =haking under the spill-over of the conflict in Syria, brought to a peak th=ough the as

is leads to two questions: when Assad realises that he will fall, will he=then try to drag with him as many enemies as he can? And: what will a post=Assad Syria look like? An acute worry has risen from reliable intelligence reports that he has arm=d up to forty warheads of Scud missiles with a variety of ch

regime, its ally in Egypt, but to no avail. It did, however, manage to help put down the Shia uprising against the Sunni government in neighboring Bahrain. It was only Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi's downfall that Saudi Arabia welcomed. Saudi-Syrian relations had been quite problematic under Qadda

Further, the influence of the Turkish Kurdish party on some Syrian Kurds is worrisome for Ankara. Moreover, the Saudi and Turkish visions for post- Assad Syria differ. Saudi Arabia advocates a Sunni Islamist regime and is establishing ties with the more radical elements in the country. Turkey, on the other