Epstein Secrets

3 only drama playing out there. Syria is also a highly tribalized and sectarian-divided country. Its Shiite-leaning Alawite minority — led by the Assads and comprising 12 percent of the population — dominates the government, army and security services. Sunni-Muslim Syrian Arabs are 75 percent, Chris

n ever. The regional balance of power is shifting against Tehran, in no small part because of its ongoing support for the beleaguered government of Bashar al- Assad in Syria. The Assad regime is failing, and in time, Iran will lose its only state ally in the Arab world and its conduit for arming the m

an continued its support for the Assad regime and backed his brutal crackdown on civilians. The Syrian uprising has become a zero-sum game: Either Bashar al-Assad will win, or the demonstrators will triumph. Likewise, it has become a proxy war between Tehran and Ankara, in which there will be only one winner.

rage for the Gaza-based leaders to prevail. The position of the llamas paramilitary Ezzeddine al-Qassam Brigades will also be crucial. Its leaders, Ahmed Jabari and Marwan Issa, have traditionally deferred to the leadership of the political bureau, and reportedly urged Meshaal not to step down as its chief

ped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it

tely made no public comment. We refused to say whether we’d had anything to do with an attack. As we he had hoped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it had ever happened, deny that he’d been trying to make a nuclear weapon, and thus feel no compelling

e operation as soon as we’d achieved its aim. On the afternoon of November 14, we launched a targeted air strike on Hamas’s de facto chief of staff, Ahmed Jabari. We’d gone after Jabari in the past but, for one reason or another, had failed. We also hit nearly two dozen other Hamas targets, including all of th

ped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it

tely made no public comment. We refused to say whether we'd had anything to do with an attack. As we he had hoped, this allowed the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, both the space and a good reason to deny that it had ever happened, deny that he'd been trying to make a nuclear weapon, and thus feel no compelling

he operation as soon as we'd achieved its aim. On the afternoon of November 14, we launched a targeted air strike on Hamas's de facto chief of staff, Ahmed Jabari. We'd gone after Jabari in the past but, for one reason or another, had failed. We also hit nearly two dozen other Hamas targets, including all of th