Epstein Secrets

with Secretary of State John Kerry here this week, the =ussian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, hinted that Moscow might finally pressure President Bashir al-Assad of Syria to l=ave office. 2 EFTA_R1_00107015 EFTA01785153 "We are not interested in the fate =f certain individuals," Mr. Lavrov said at a late

y furt=er. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the f=ll of Bashar al-Assad. Israel knows one important thin= about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve so=e form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war --

e, the Alawite regime in Damascus and Hezbol=ah in Lebanon) is hell-bent on robbing them of their historic place in Iraq, their government's tilt to=ard Bashar al-Assad provided it. 5 EFTA_R1_00107018 EFTA01785156 It was a matter of time before =hese millennial conflicts were given new life by the Syrian civil w

untries have always been at war -- Syria has yet to officially r=cognize Israel -- but Israel has been able to count on the governments of =afez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1=74, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage poin

ing between Syria's Alawite regime and the Sunni=led rebellion would remain within the country's borders. Syria is at once the pivot and a mirror of the Fertile Crescent, =nd its sectarian and ethnic fissures reproduce themselves in neighboring A=ab states. As an oddly passive President Obama ponders what he might d

3 only drama playing out there. Syria is also a highly tribalized and sectarian-divided country. Its Shiite-leaning Alawite minority — led by the Assads and comprising 12 percent of the population — dominates the government, army and security services. Sunni-Muslim Syrian Arabs are 75 percent, Chris

n ever. The regional balance of power is shifting against Tehran, in no small part because of its ongoing support for the beleaguered government of Bashar al- Assad in Syria. The Assad regime is failing, and in time, Iran will lose its only state ally in the Arab world and its conduit for arming the m

an continued its support for the Assad regime and backed his brutal crackdown on civilians. The Syrian uprising has become a zero-sum game: Either Bashar al-Assad will win, or the demonstrators will triumph. Likewise, it has become a proxy war between Tehran and Ankara, in which there will be only one winner.

am Hussein, are now making amends. They are also closely aligning with Turkey to balance Iranian influence inside Iraq. Turkish-Iranian rivalry in the Fertile Crescent has opened up a can of worms: Iranian leaders attack Turkey's "secular Islam" and threaten to "strike Turkey" should Ankara act on its commitment

bate is taking place in the Iranian establishment over whether its regional policies—backing Shi'a and Shi'a-friendly forces like Hezbollah and the Assad and Maliki governments to the hilt in brutal civil wars-is working. According to The Wall Street Journal, Iranian doves are pointing to the recent

Bye, Bye, Sykes-Picot." In other words, they are out to bring down not only the Syrian and Iraqi regimes but also the Arab system itself. President Bashar Al-Assad had said, in an interview with a Lebanese paper two weeks ago, that Damascus has received messages from Western governments lately. The Saudi roy

remarkable consolidation of Sunni sentiment against the Shi'a as Iran and its allies make gains. The disparate Sunni terrorist and tribal groups in the Fertile Crescent have united, for now, under the banner of ISIS, which shook the region and the world by routing Iraq's army and occupying much of the country. Mea