Epstein Secrets

with Secretary of State John Kerry here this week, the =ussian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, hinted that Moscow might finally pressure President Bashir al-Assad of Syria to l=ave office. 2 EFTA_R1_00107015 EFTA01785153 "We are not interested in the fate =f certain individuals," Mr. Lavrov said at a late

y furt=er. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the f=ll of Bashar al-Assad. Israel knows one important thin= about the Assads: for the past 40 years, they have managed to preserve so=e form of calm along the border. Technically, the two countries have always been at war --

e, the Alawite regime in Damascus and Hezbol=ah in Lebanon) is hell-bent on robbing them of their historic place in Iraq, their government's tilt to=ard Bashar al-Assad provided it. 5 EFTA_R1_00107018 EFTA01785156 It was a matter of time before =hese millennial conflicts were given new life by the Syrian civil w

untries have always been at war -- Syria has yet to officially r=cognize Israel -- but Israel has been able to count on the governments of =afez and Bashar Assad to enforce the Separation of Forces Agreement from 1=74, in which both sides agreed to a cease-fire in the Golan Heights, the disputed vantage poin

has long called for a referendum on the treaty, viewing the rest=ictions on Egyptian forces in the Sinai as an affront to national sovereig=ty. The Brothers condemned Morsi's involvement in resolving the Gaza crisis last year, portraying it as kowto=ing to Israel. In fact, Morsi is under fire from both t

ompensate Egypt for lost American military assistance. The Syrian crisis and the US administration's reluctant position towards acting against the Bashar Al-Assad regime came to add to the sources of difference, particularly after the Obama administration retreated from its threats to strike Al-Assad's regime

reats to strike Al-Assad's regime and engaged in a deal on Syrian EFTA00705807 chemical weapons, which gave another opportunity of survival to Al- Assad. The major source of the US-Saudi difference, however, came on Iran — particularly after the initial agreement on its nuclear programme, which Saud

ping even bankrupt Greece, between 2006 and 2012. Yet this mood of misery does not seem to have engendered any lingering sympathies for the fallen Brothers, whose efforts to sustain protests are met mostly with annoyance. Despite anguish over police brutality and the death of some 3,000 people since th

ington should be doing more to buttress the anti-Assad forces in Syria and the military government in E

Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and other places that the Saudis are concerned about. So that's a major difference. The United States wants Syrian president Bashar al-Assad gone, but we put a much lower priority on it than the Saudis do. The other big issue on which there are differences is Egypt. While the United Stat

in the Arab world stood against Saudi Arabia and with Saddam Hussein against the U.S. military intervention. The Saudis have been suspicious of the Brothers since then, and with the upsurge in political activity in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War, lots of Saudi leaders blamed the Brotherhood as be

ces the old idea of dynasty. The regime of the Al-Assads does not believe in freedom of information. An A

ent Hafez Al-Assad's brother, Rifat, killed 10,000 (some say 20,000). As a showdown intensifies a generation later, it is another pair of brothers, Bashar and Maher, poised to do the same, against demonstrators lightly armed or weaponless but willing to look EFTA_R1_02032813 EFTA02691196 35 death

president Abu Ela Madi) are EFTA_R1_02032796 EFTA02691179 18 former Brotherhood members. (Al-Wasat has less conservative social views than the Brothers and include Copts among its leaders.) Apart from the remains of the dissolved National Democratic Party and the parties authorised under Mubarak —

ce that the world has stood idly by as Bashar al-Assad has presided over the deaths of some 100,000 Syr

hone calls from Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. And one reason is Syria: Egyptian generals can't help but notice that the world has stood idly by as Bashar al-Assad has presided over the deaths of some 100,000 Syrian citizens. In the Middle East, you can, in fact, get away with murder. The Egyptian military wi

gain plunged into violence. On August 14th armed police, backed by helicopters in the skies and bulldozers on the streets, stormed thousands of the Brothers' supporters encamped beside a mosque and a university in Cairo. Hundreds were killed and nearly 3,000 injured and the violence spread to other cit

nt position towards acting against the Bashar Al-Assad regime came to add to the sources of difference,

compensate Egypt for lost American military assistance. The Syrian crisis and the US administration's reluctant position towards acting against the Bashar Al-Assad regime came to add to the sources of difference, particularly after the Obama administration retreated from its threats to strike Al-Assad's regim

ping even bankrupt Greece, between 2006 and 2012. Yet this mood of misery does not seem to have engendered any lingering sympathies for the fallen Brothers, whose efforts to sustain protests are met mostly with annoyance. Despite anguish over police brutality and the death of some 3,000 people since t

for President Assad to step aside." We invested little in aid or support to effect this. One year later, the president articulated his red line on Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons. Rightly or wrongly, he did so without obtaining a promise of congressional backing. But when proof of that use became unmi

he U.S. approach to Syria has been a combination of bluster and retreat. In August 2011, President Obama said that "the time has come for President Assad to step aside." We invested little in aid or support to effect this. One year later, the president articulated his red line on Bashar al-Assad's us

ounding political phenomenon, and Mr. Hamid is acute on the paradoxes they present. He points out, for example, that repression and jail, which the Brothers have endured intermittently since Hassan al-Banna founded the group in 1928, actually made them more EFTA00684072 moderate and not more radical,

ts former secretary-general. The latest failure of the U.N. dream was Annan's mediating mission to Syria. For months, he tried to cajole President Bashar al-Assad into stopping the killing and starting a political transition that would avert civil war. To which he received the standard answer to well-meaning

Abdullah of Jordan back in 2004 of the danger of a Shia Crescent that would extend from the coast of Lebanon to Afghanistan. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Assad in Syria, and the Shia- controlled government of Iraq form the links in the chain. When the Arab Spring reached Syria, the leaders in Riyadh were gi

he Muslim Brotherhood -- or more precisely, the Freedom and Justice Party -- have made a number of questionable moves that raise concerns about the Brothers' commitment to democratic change. Despite seeking to shut down a television station, throwing the editor of the daily al Dostour in the dock for i

ves and diplomats have stepped up their contacts with Syrian rebels in part to help organize their burgeoning military operations against President Bashar al-Assad's forces, according to senior U.S. officials." This would certainly be promising news—except it is the third time in the last month administration

uld have little trouble finding suitable recipients. It hasn't because the White House isn't eager to act. The question is, will moral revulsion at Assad's crimes finally force it off the sidelines? It's understandable why a conflict that by some estimates has already cost the lives of more than 14,

ristians, about 10% of the population, are understandably anxious—not least because, to get elected, Mr Morsi will need the support not just of the Brothers but also of the Salafists, a far more worrying band of Islamists who hark back to the puritanism of the Prophet Muhammad's era and who have amassed