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ulgaria, seen its activities disrupted in Cyprus and Thailand, and worked to plot attacks elsewhere. It is helping to prop up the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria; and it acts as a proxy for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the region and beyond. In doing so, Hezbollah is putting the well
elping to prop up the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria; and it acts as a proxy for Iran's Isla
llah's organizational structure do not allow for a separation into military and political wings. Using statements from Hezbollah's top leadership, Levitt demonstrates that the organization has repeatedly affirmed its monolithic nature. As Hezbollah's second most senior official, Naim Qassem, put it l
nsider whether a transgression was committed (did Assad use chemical weapons?), rather than focus- ing en
not always true for continuous variables. Consider the longstanding norm against the use of chemical weapons. This norm recently made headlines when Bashar al-Assad was alleged to have used chemical weapons to kill about a thousand Syrian civilians, outraging world leaders who had HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015514 --- PAG
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015515 →We say that the norm against chemical weapons is a categorical norm because those who abide by it consider whether a transgression was committed (did Assad use chemical weapons?), rather than focus- ing entirely on how much harm was done (how many civilians did Assad kill?). Other norms are similarly cat
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015515 →mage concerns and prosocial behavior: Field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76(2), 225-237. Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007). What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? The Journal of Economic Perspe
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015527 →ents, but when Washington offers a more passive response, Iranian aggression increases. With respect to Syria, for example, it cannot be assumed that Bashar al-Assad will fall at all, let alone quickly, without active U.S. engagement. If the Assad HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018204 --- PAGE BREAK --- regime does in fact su
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018205 →w Levitt, a former State Department counterterrorism official. “Hizballah and the Quds Force traded speed for tradecraft and reaped what they sowed,” Levitt writes in a January report for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “Quds Force planners were stretched thin by the rapid tempo of their ne
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018211 →ents, but when Washington offers a more passive response, Iranian aggression increases. With respect to Syria, for example, it cannot be assumed that Bashar al-Assad will fall at all, let alone quickly, without active U.S. engagement. If the Assad HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028655 --- PAGE BREAK --- regime does in fact sur
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028656 →e years to pull together. Yet in the 15 months from May 2011 to July 2012, the Quds Force and Hizballah attempted 20 attacks, by the count of Matthew Levitt, a former State Department counterterrorism official. "Hizballah and the Quds Force traded speed for tradecraft and reaped what they sowed," Levitt w
Page: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028662 →Entities connected to both Bashar al-Assad and Levitt

Barack Obama
PERSON
United States
LOCATION
Benjamin Netanyahu
PERSON
Tehran
LOCATION
Bill Clinton
PERSON
Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON
Saddam Hussein
PERSON
Marc Rich
PERSON
Hillary Clinton
PERSON
Jerusalem
LOCATION
Donald Trump
PERSON
Joe Biden
PERSON
Michael Cohen
PERSON
West Bank
LOCATION
Mahmoud Abbas
PERSON
Prince Andrew
PERSON
John Kerry
PERSON
John F. Kennedy
PERSON
North Korea
LOCATION
Baghdad
LOCATION