Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

ent and work product privilege to all documents called for by a subpoena without providing a privilege log or any other specific information. Judge Selya strenuously criticized this practice, commenting: they do not identify any particular documents as privileged, nor do they specify the reasons why

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

ent and work product privilege to all documents called for by a subpoena without providing a privilege log or any other specific information. Judge Selya strenuously criticized this practice, commenting: they do not identify any particular documents as privileged, nor do they specify the reasons why

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

ent and work product privilege to all documents called for by a subpoena without providing a privilege log or any other specific information. Judge Selya strenuously criticized this practice, commenting: they do not identify any particular documents as privileged, nor do they specify the reasons why