Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

ry Matter No. 91-01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privilege

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

ury Matter No. 91-01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States I Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privilege

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City, 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privileg