Epstein Secrets

the least egregious conduct proscribed by the Montana stat- ute tngi6 must qualify as an offense "rela ' o ... sexual abuse." See id. at 1206-07; Valencia Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1046, 1052 & n. 3 (9th Cir.2 ). If such conduct does not qualify, the Montana statute is over-inclusive on its face. The Mon

f- fense, which applies? United States, ev rel. Harris' Daniels, 279 Fed. 844 (2nd Cir.I992), provides guidance on this issue. In Ex. rel. Harris, the Second Circuit was faced with a potential conflict between two senten- cing provisions, one which permitted " 'all sen- tences' of summary court-martial [to] be ca

. Moulder, 141 F.3d at 571; Price, 95 F.3d at 367; United States v. Laday, 56 F.3d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1995); Wittie, 25 F.3d at 262; United States v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 760 (5th Cir.I993). The government argues that the appropri- C 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. https://web2.

t 1313. Hoffenberg suggests that United States v. Leonard, 50 F.3d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir.I995), suggests a high- er standard of proof. In Leonard, the Second Circuit instructed that "the district court should consider any evidence with a significant degree of probative value, and should rest its finding on evid

. Centner, 116 F.3d 473 (Table), 1997 WI. 328766, at *2 (4th Cir.1997); United States v. Leder, 23 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir.1994); United Stales v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 680 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gallishcaa 428 F2d 760 (2d Cir.I970). [4] As noted, there is sufficient evi- dence to allow a

it as a pattern of racketeering activity"); see also Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co.. 187 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that the Second Circuit "has never held a period of less than two years to constitute a substantial period of time"). Second, the criminal activities allegedly committed