Epstein Secrets

daptive regulation of the nonlinear dynamics of electrical activity of the brain. Neurosci Behav Physiol 28:366-375 Molnar, M., Gacs,G., Ujvari, G., Skinner, J.E., Karmos, G. (1997) Dimensional complexity of the EEG in subcortical stroke--a case study. Int J Psychophysiol. 25:193-199 Montroll, E.W., Badg

actals 3:893-904 Seneta, E. (1981) Non-negative Matrices and Markoff Chains. Springer-Verlag, New York. 286 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_013786 Shannon, C.D., Weaver, W. (1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois Press, Urbana Sharkovskii, A.N. (1964): Coexistence of the cycles of a

We avoid the temptation to deal with the deep analogy between thermodynamic entropy (Clausius, 1897) and information theoretic entropy (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), constraining our discussion to the context of an operational equivalence (in healthy systems) between gain of information and 238 HOUSE_OV

space become symbolic dynamics in sequence space. It was Kolmogoroff (1958) who first applied Shannon’s ideas of entropy and information (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Khinchin, 1957) to the quantification of these dynamical system’s telegraphic messages as discrete, “stochastic” (random, probabilistic) outp

l idea was that actions that were rewarded would be repeated and those that were punished would not, until the desired behavior was achieved. Even in Skinner’s day, this simple process, repeated over and over, could lead to complex behavior. Computers are designed to perform simple operations over and over

n particular, information must not be confused with meaning.”?! Linguists and poets might be concerned about the “semantic” aspects of communication, Weaver continued, but not engineers like Shannon. Rather, “this word ‘information’ in communication theory relates not so much to what you do say, as to wha

es.” Information cannot be conserved—so far, so good. But did Wiener really have Shannon’s “information” in mind? The crux of Shannon’s argument, as Weaver had emphasized, was to distinguish a colloquial sense of “information,” as message with meaning, from an abstracted, rarefied notion of strings of sy

l idea was that actions that were rewarded would be repeated and those that were punished would not, until the desired behavior was achieved. Even in Skinner’s day, this simple process, repeated over and over, could lead to complex behavior. Computers are designed to perform simple operations over and over

n particular, information must not be confused with meaning.”?! Linguists and poets might be concerned about the “semantic” aspects of communication, Weaver continued, but not engineers like Shannon. Rather, “this word ‘information’ in communication theory relates not so much to what you do say, as to wha

es.” Information cannot be conserved—so far, so good. But did Wiener really have Shannon’s “information” in mind? The crux of Shannon’s argument, as Weaver had emphasized, was to distinguish a colloquial sense of “information,” as message with meaning, from an abstracted, rarefied notion of strings of sy