Epstein Secrets

inate Experimental Conditions in Studies of Biological Dynamics We avoid the temptation to deal with the deep analogy between thermodynamic entropy (Clausius, 1897) and information theoretic entropy (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), constraining our discussion to the context of an operational equivalence (in he

actals 3:893-904 Seneta, E. (1981) Non-negative Matrices and Markoff Chains. Springer-Verlag, New York. 286 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_013786 Shannon, C.D., Weaver, W. (1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois Press, Urbana Sharkovskii, A.N. (1964): Coexistence of the cycles of a

We avoid the temptation to deal with the deep analogy between thermodynamic entropy (Clausius, 1897) and information theoretic entropy (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), constraining our discussion to the context of an operational equivalence (in healthy systems) between gain of information and 238 HOUSE_OV

space become symbolic dynamics in sequence space. It was Kolmogoroff (1958) who first applied Shannon’s ideas of entropy and information (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Khinchin, 1957) to the quantification of these dynamical system’s telegraphic messages as discrete, “stochastic” (random, probabilistic) outp

at had been around since the Enlightenment (boosted by the Industrial Revolution). The names in this lineage include Descartes, Leibniz, Sadi Carnot, Clausius, Maxwell, and Watt. Wiener’s coinage nonetheless had profound cultural effects.4”7 The ubiquity today of the prefix “cyber-” confirms the desire for

n particular, information must not be confused with meaning.”?! Linguists and poets might be concerned about the “semantic” aspects of communication, Weaver continued, but not engineers like Shannon. Rather, “this word ‘information’ in communication theory relates not so much to what you do say, as to wha

es.” Information cannot be conserved—so far, so good. But did Wiener really have Shannon’s “information” in mind? The crux of Shannon’s argument, as Weaver had emphasized, was to distinguish a colloquial sense of “information,” as message with meaning, from an abstracted, rarefied notion of strings of sy

at had been around since the Enlightenment (boosted by the Industrial Revolution). The names in this lineage include Descartes, Leibniz, Sadi Carnot, Clausius, Maxwell, and Watt. Wiener’s coinage nonetheless had profound cultural effects.4”7 The ubiquity today of the prefix “cyber-” confirms the desire for

n particular, information must not be confused with meaning.”?! Linguists and poets might be concerned about the “semantic” aspects of communication, Weaver continued, but not engineers like Shannon. Rather, “this word ‘information’ in communication theory relates not so much to what you do say, as to wha

es.” Information cannot be conserved—so far, so good. But did Wiener really have Shannon’s “information” in mind? The crux of Shannon’s argument, as Weaver had emphasized, was to distinguish a colloquial sense of “information,” as message with meaning, from an abstracted, rarefied notion of strings of sy