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force its orders, to conduct its business in a proper manner, and to protect the court from acts obstructing the administration of justice." Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Maves & Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608-09 (Fla. 1994). Most recently, the Supreme Court in Bitterman v.

es expressly addressed to the trial court's exercise of discretion. See Event Services America, Inc. v. Ragusa 917 So.2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). As the Florida Supreme Court later explained, Icilearly, a trial judge has the inherent power to do those things necessary to enforce its orders, to conduct its business in a p

rida in 1907 to provide legal immunity for actions that occur in judicial proceedings. Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907). In Levitt, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.I994), the Florida Supreme Court extended the litigation pri

Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907). In Levitt, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.I994), the Florida Supreme Court extended the litigation privilege, already applicable to defamatory statements (slander and libel) and perjury, to all other torts so long as the

association, and the state," and as such "other tortious conduct occurring during litigation is equally susceptible to that same discipline." Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) (citing Wright, 446 So. 2d at 1164). Accordingly, Levin neither held

ving the litigation privilege. In the instant case, the trial court was legally bound by the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Wolfe, as the Florida Supreme Court stated unequivocally that a "trial court may not overrule or recede from the controlling decision of" an appellate court. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2

to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.510(c). This court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCalla, Rayner, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 38

ssue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R.Civ. P. 1.510(c). This court, in applying the Florida Supreme Court binding precedent as espoused in Levin, Middlebrooks, Moves & Mitchell, v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994) and Echevarria, McCa