Epstein Secrets

branches of Al Hara- main have since been designated. See Exec. Order No. 13224 (designating BIF (November 19, 2002) and branches of Al Haramain (Bosnia, Somalia on March 11, 2002; Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanza- nia on January 22, 2004; Afghanistan, Al- bania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, the Nether- la

pation in al Qaida's jihadist campaign." Id. 11425. Specifical- ly, the Kingdom allegedly maintained and controlled several of the charities within al Qaeda's infrastructure. Id. 11399. The Federal Plaintiffs claim Saudi Arabia knew the threat that these charities posed par- ticularly to the United State

e Sultan and Prince Turki both move to dismiss the complaints against them in Ashton v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army. 02 Civ. 6977 (S.D.N.Y.); Barrera v. AI Qaeda Islamic Army, 03 Civ. 7036 (S.D.N.Y.); Burnett v. AI Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 02 Civ. 1616 (D.D.C.); Burnett v. Al Baraka hrv. & Dev. § 2331 et

began a company in the 1940s that now supplies automobiles, soft drinks, construction equipment, and other related to any alleged conspiracy or to al Gaeda's activities. EFTA00795081 IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Cut as 349 F.Supp-20 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) goods and services to large port

including charities, banks, front organizations, terrorist organizations, and financiers who provided financial, lo- gistical, and other support to al Qaeda.1 See, e.g., Ashton Complaint 1 5; Burnett Complaint "Introduction"; Federal Com- plaint 11142-66. The complaints assert subject matter jurisdiction

6. The various complaints make substan- tially similar accusations against Prince Sultan. See Consolidated Jeffress Decl. 16. IIRO is allegedly an al Oaeda front that has been tied to the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the 1998 embassy bombings. See, e.g., Burnett Complaint 711 156, 240, 242. 17.

t mem- bers of the Spanish al Qaeda cell used Arab Bank to make wire transfers. Bur- nett Complaint 1 138 (alleging Arab Bank is "used regularly by al Qaecla's Spanish cell for transfers of cash to members of al Qaeda operating in Germany, Pakistan, Af- ghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Bosnia, and elsewhere");

ugh their contributions to, and support of, Islamic charities that they knew or should have known were supporting ter- rorist organizations such as al Qaeda.n Additionally, Plaintiffs allege Prince Turki aided and abetted the terrorists by at- tempting to deflect their activities away from Saudi Arabia and

Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C.2003)—Plaintiffs submit that the moving Defendants knew that the primary target of Osama bin Laden's and al Qae- da's campaign of terror was the United States and that by providing assistance to these terrorists, who Plaintiffs claim were Defendants' co-conspirato

149 F.3d at 123; Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1023; Bohn III, 340 F.Supp2d at 906. Even move and launder money. 12(e) Statement I. Plaintiffs allege that al Oaeda has pervert- ed the Zakat and Hararm principles in Islam- ic banking to collect and distribute money to individuals and cells throughout the world.

ve military has become a constant source of frustration to civilian leaders. Irritated by the Pentagon's hesitation to put "boots on the ground" in Bosnia, then- Secretary of State Madeline Albright famously demanded of Secretary of Defense Colin Powell, "What good is this marvellous military force if

one of which are likely to field large numbers of troops or maintain expensive arsenals of their own. In the face of these new enemies, typified by al-Qaida, the mass armies of nation-states are highly ineffective, cumbersome to deploy, difficult to manoeuvre, and from a domestic point of view, overly

ve military has become a constant source of frustration to civilian leaders. Irritated by the Pentagon's hesitation to put "boots on the ground" in Bosnia, then- Secretary of State Madeline Albright famously demanded of Secretary of Defense Colin Powell, "What good is this marvellous military force if

one of which are likely to field large numbers of troops or maintain expensive arsenals of their own. In the face of these new enemies, typified by al-Qaida, the mass armies of nation-states are highly ineffective, cumbersome to deploy, difficult to manoeuvre, and from a domestic point of view, overly

mi-secret organization with unseen but munificent benefactors, probably in Saudi Arabia. They have long acted as recruitment networks for causes in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan during the Soviet war (1979-89). Today they have ties to the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, who in turn have ties to Iraqi re

cy in the region. Salafism enjoys an intermediary position between the conservative House of Saud and the revolutionary al-Qaeda movement. Part of al-Qaeda's appeal over the years has been its argument that secular dictatorships are unreformable and can only be brought down through armed struggle, which

ration of war-torn territories, notably the United Nations administrations of Kosovo and East Timor, and the High Representative's administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is an international transitional authority a viable and attractive option for Gaza? What would its mandate be? Would the mission h

e bomb-making materials were discovered, and officials revealed that he communicated with Khatiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KIP), a group affiliated with AI-Qaeda, with plans to travel to Syria to become a bomb- maker. The article noted that Abdul-Rahman had searched for parade locations, including trashcans al

ion; BGC Partners, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, indirectly owns more than 10% of it. 11-3490, 11-3494, 11-3495, 11-3511 (Federal Ins. Co. v. al Qaida): Appellants Federal Insurance Company, Pacific Indemnity Company, Chubb Custom Insurance Company, Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company, Chubb Insuranc

aeessreeenseeeseseaess 24 The Role of Ostensible Charities in al-Qaeda’s Growth and Development 2.00... cccceescceesseeeeteeceeeseeeeeteeeeteneeee 28 Al-Qaeda’s Collaborators in the Financial Industry cee eecsssssseesseessseeesneeceseceseeesneeenseceseeesneeseseceseeeaeeeeneeeateeeatersneess 42 Al-Qaeda’s Add

§ 2333, knew that or recklessly disregarded whether al-Qaeda was the recipient of the financial and other support each defendant was providing to al-Qaeda. 2. Whether, for purposes of claims asserting violations of “the law of nations” under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, such violations inc

m- HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017830 --- PAGE BREAK --- 766 ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as insurance carriers, brought actions against al Qaeda, al Qaeda’s members and associ- ates, alleged state sponsors of terrorism, and individuals and entities who allegedly provided support to Al Qaeda, asserting cau

m Act (ATA) complaint by survivors of victims of September 11, 2001 attacks, alleging that Saudi Princes con- tributed to charities that supported al Qaeda, and that al Qaeda repeatedly and publicly targeted United States, failed to allege causal connection sufficient to satis- fy New York standard for c

with the Ashton case on Decem- ber 6, 2004. Prince Sultan and Prince Turki have each also filed a separate motion to dismiss in Federal Insurance v. Al Qaida, 03 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y.), both of which are fully submitted and are resolved in this opinion. The Federal Insurance Plaintiffs are forty-one insuranc