Epstein Secrets

principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine — prosecutors are delegates of the President, helping him

litigation.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). The work-product doctrine applies in civil and criminal litigation. Id. at 236. In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court described the policy behind the doctrine protecting the opinion work-product of lawyers. The Court explained that a lawyer is bou

nalysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996) (Judicial deference [94] to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of

"it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain r 161 degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a part

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents an

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents an

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wane, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

that "it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947). The privilege is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3): Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents an