Epstein Secrets

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

rvice of the subpoena, Ms.= retained the services of James Eisenberg, Esq. to represent her. Jeffrey Epstein paid for that representation. 3. Mr. Eisenberg communicated to me orally and in writing that Ms. would assert her Fifth Amendment privilege if she were forced to appear before the grand jury, an

g principle that It]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large pan to the separation of powers doctrine — prosecutors are delegates of the President, helping him

the investigation if the facts arc known or might attempt to escape if they have reason to believe certain indictments will issue. United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958)). Several of the "facts" contained

97 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required under the Due Process Clause). ° United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 456-71 (1996) (examining selective prosecution claim based on racial bias); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)

lack Jacket): A Critique on the Lack of Prosecution of Hunting "Accidents," 56.S.C. L. Rev. 135, 166-73 (2004). © See id.; Duane, supra note 48. 5! Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 893-96 (discussing data from prosecutor interviews). In the contexts Eisenberg describes, prosecutors typically forgo hate-crime o