Epstein Secrets

eir [' 934] class in part on a disparate treatment theory. See Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274 n.10 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 633, 370 U.S. App. D.C. 280 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("Establishing commonality for a disparate treatment class is particularly d

ntiary standard leaves this circuit alone on an island. The Brown I majority suggested that its lenient view of the necessary evidence aligned with the Second Circuit's decision in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). See Brown I, 576 F.3d at 157 (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d at 293).

age 4 of 30 Ferguson v. FBI, 957 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1992) 8 Ferguson v. FBI, No. 89 Civ. 5071 (RPP), 1995 WL 329307 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 19 95) 5 Garcia v. U.S. Dept ofJustice, 181 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 5 Grand Cent. P .ship v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1999) 13, 14 Hopkins v. U.S.

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

age 4 of 30 Ferguson v. FBI, 957 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1992) 8 Ferguson v. FBI, No. 89 Civ. 5071 (RPP), 1995 WL 329307 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 19 95) 5 Garcia v. U.S. Dept ofJustice, 181 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 5 Grand Cent. P .ship v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1999) 13, 14 Hopkins v. U.S.

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

age 4 of 30 Ferguson v. FBI, 957 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1992) 8 Ferguson v. FBI, No. 89 Civ. 5071 (RPP), 1995 WL 329307 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 19 95) 5 Garcia v. U.S. Dept ofJustice, 181 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 5 Grand Cent. P .ship v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1999) 13, 14 Hopkins v. U.S.

y communications about how to interact with the public may be subject to the deliberative process privilege and concluding, including by relying on the Second Circuit's decision in ACLU, 844 F.3d at 133, that "[a's long as communications are pre-decisional and deliberative, internal agency communications about publ

view of the scope of expert testimony.23 However, the Government has not noticed the three law 23 For instance, the defense, citing United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005), makes the sweeping claim that "any opinion testimony" based on those three law enforcement witnesses' "specialized 't

nment to identify the co-conspirator statements it plans to use at trial in its initial round of pretrial motions. There, the defendant argued that the Second Circuit's practice of conditional admission of co-conspirator statements at trial would prejudice her because "any cautionary instruction would be of doubtful