Epstein Secrets

as impliedly waived it through his own affirmative conduct. Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (emphasis added); see also Stern v. 0 'Quinn, 253 F.R.D. 663 (S.D. Fla. 2008). "Implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege can occur where a party voluntarily injects either a

eir work product waived any claim of privilege. Id. at 1008 (emphasis added). Indeed, Edwards' clients made this argument in their Answer Brief to the Eleventh Circuit! See Excerpt of Ans. Br. in Jane Doe I v. United States, Exhibit at pp. 35-36. Edwards' contrary legal argument now is nothing more than presently

oth the victims and the Government agree that the relevant legal standard governing the question of waiver of work-production protections comes from Stern v. O'Quinn, 253 F.R.D. 663, 676-77 (S.D. Fla. 2008), which held that "a party waives work-product privilege protection when (1) assertion of the pr

ile simultaneously brandishing it as a shield from disclosure of any Achilles heels." Stern v. O'Quinn, 253 F.R.D. 663, 677 (S.D. Ha. 2008). Or, as the Eleventh Circuit has articulated the principle, a litigant "can no more advance the work-product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work-product [pr

trine in this case does not "deny the opposing party access to information vital to its defense." Stern, 253 F.R.D. at 676. In that case, plaintiff Stern was suing defendant O'Quinn, and O'Quinn's law firm, for defamation. O'Quinn had instituted an investigation of plaintiff Stern, which was conducted

re to impeachment at trial comes well within the prosecutor's discretionary authority. In defining the contours of a prosecutor's absolute immunity. the Eleventh Circuit observed that, "IiImmunity extends to a prosecutor's 'out-of-court effort to control the presentation of a witness' testimony' because that act is

trine in this case does not "deny the opposing party access to information vital to its defense." Stern, 253 F.R.D. at 676. In that case, plaintiff Stern was suing defendant O'Quinn, and O'Quinn's law firm, for defamation. O'Quinn had instituted an investigation of plaintiff Stern, which was conducted

re to impeachment at trial comes well within the prosecutor's discretionary authority. In defining the contours of a prosecutor's absolute immunity. the Eleventh Circuit observed that, "IiImmunity extends to a prosecutor's 'out-of-court effort to control the presentation of a witness' testimony' because that act is

n be waived — indeed, such protection can be waived "impliedly." A very thorough review of the relevant caselaw is found in this Court's decision in Stern v. O'Quinn, 253 F.R.D. 663, 676-77 (S.D. Fla. 2008). As this Court explained, under the doctrine of implied waiver of work product protection, "a p

r protections. I. Work-Product Protection, as Well as Attorney-Client Privilege, Can Be Explicitly or Impliedly Waived. Case law from this Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court all make clear that work product protection can be waived — indeed, such protection can be waived "impliedly." A very thorou

ill be reversed. The order of the District Court granting sum- mary judgment on Counts Four and Seven will be affirmed as to all appellees, except Stern, with respect to whom the order will be reversed. The District Court's dismiss- al of Count Five on statute of limitations grounds will be affirmed

h Cir.1970), and more • nay by the Fourth Circuit, Air Transit NLRB, 879 F2d 1101 (4th Cir.1982), Board sought to impose the same infes- tation on the Eleventh Circuit. The effort is to no avail. [24] We hold that the daily lessees are independent contractors and not employees of the Company and contrary findin