Epstein Secrets

F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) passim Mitchell v. Fishbein, 227 F.R.D. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 15 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) 10 Nixon v. Warner Corn:wins, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) 10 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) 10 Savitt v. Vacco, No. 95-CV-1

ng to seal judicial records to ensure that the courts do not sacrifice the public's right of access to the desires of the litigations. See generally Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (First Amendment and common law right to judicial documents); In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec.

tlement). Neither of the Parties have presented the "specific, on-the-record findings" that establish a compelling reason for sealing or redaction. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. Quite the opposite — the Court initially granted at least 35 letter motions to seal documents, the vast majority with de minimis

emaining documents, the majority of which are those submitted in opposition or support to discovery motions, also qualify.' Citing the broad rule in Lugosch, the court in Alexander Interactive, Inc. v. Adorama, Inc., No. 12 CIV. 6608 PKC JCF, 2014 WL 4346174, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014), stated that

, 12 Lytle v. JPMorgan Chase, 810 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) passim Martindell v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) 10 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) 3 Prescient Acquisition Grp., Inc. v. MJ Public Trust, 487 F. Supp. 2d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 9 S.E.

o see how [Maxwell] can reasonably argue that [she] produced documents in reliance on the fact that the documents would always be kept secret." See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125. Contrary to Maxwell's argument, Brown is of no help to her here and does not support keeping Maxwell's deposition under seal in i

tive order is an umbrella protective order that "specifically contemplates that relief from the provisions of the order may be sought at any time." Lugosch, 435 at 125; ECF No. 62 fill, 14. Maxwell cannot use such an umbrella order to shield the entirety of her deposition from the public. "Given this pr

Circuit squarely addressed and rejected the argument Maxwell currently makes in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). In Lugosch, "[t]he district court suggested that [a] 10 EFTA00075037 CasqaPIRWM43P4AlaleDiggrfieAnag041401§/234,26a1PaiAcif53tif 24 confidentiality order w

t to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." Nixon v. Warner Commtans, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,599 (1978). The panel lacks the context and familiarity with the facts, the parties and the non-parties to a

—and the Court in its Order to Show Cause—rested heavily on Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). With respect, neither Lugosch nor any of the other 6 EFTA00791875 Case 18-2868, Document 141, 03/15/2019, 2519388, Page8 of 27 Second Circuit cases supports the position the

the parties. The Order to Show Cause rests on a number of premises that we respectfully submit are flawed. As the Court noted in the Order, under Lugosch a" strong presumption of access" attaches to documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a summary judgment motion. Doc.138 at 2. But a

as the potential to exacerbate these harms to privacy and reputation by ensuring that damaging material irrevocably enters the public record. 9 Nixon v. Inisner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). 10 See notes 46-47 and accompanying text, post. We therefore

narrowly tailored to achieve that aim."I3 12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may "be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and non-frivolous arguments."

" Id. at 122. Insofar as a district court has, through striking a filing, specifically found that assumption inapplicable, the categorical rule in Lugosch may not apply. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text, post. 13 Id. at 124. Examples of such countervailing values may include, depending on the c

s' responsibility to exercise these powerful tools. We also caution the public to critically assess allegations contained in judicial pleadings. 9 Nixon v. Warner Cotnmens, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 1° See notes 46-47 and accompanying text, post. 10 EFTA00092317 A. Standard of Review When

g order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim."13 " Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2016). 12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties ma

ann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2016). 12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may "be assumed to have supported their papers with admissible evidence and non- frivolous arguments."

he service of the subpoena. If the victim objects, the Court will then determine whether to modify or quash the subpoena, including on grounds that Nixon was not satisfied."). In advance of noticing an appearance and filing, the law firm shall meet and confer with defense counsel to see if any issues

The law firm's objections with any proposed redactions shall be filed on or before March 26, 2021. Any redactions must be justified consistent with Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Within one week of the filing of objections, defense counsel may respond to the subpoena o

Newsday LLC v. Cnoi. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2013) 18, 20 iii EFTA00075480 Case 20-2413, Document 40, 08/20/2020, 2913550, Page5 of 74 Nixon a Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) Nosik a Singe, 40 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1994) Press-Enter. Co. a Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) S.E.C.

e minimally redacted material was subject to a "strong presumption" of access under the First Amendment and the common law. Id. at 47 & n.12 (citing Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121-22). The deposition material at issue here, however, was not submitted to the district court in connection with summary judgment

F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). The Court thus concludes that there is a common law and a First Amendment presumption of access. Id. at 146; see also Nixon v. Warner Commc 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978). The question, then, is whether the redaction and sealing requests are narrowly tailored to ser

First, the Government's brief in opposition to the Defendant's pre-trial motions is a "judicial document" for purposes of the first element of the Lugosch test. United States v. Arnodeo ("Arnodeo I"), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). The Court thus concludes that there is a common law and a First Amend

008) (finding that where classified information presented at trial, if disclosed, would jeopardize national security weighed against public access); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (existence of confidentiality order alone did not defeat presumption of public access); Hanf

ch as using records "to gratify spite or promote scandals" or where files might serve "as reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption." Nixon v. Warner Commcins, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); see also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051 (internal quotation marks an

ts, with the exceptions discussed below. To begin with, the Court's reasoning is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Under this test, the Court must: (i) determine whether the documents in question are "judic

F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). The Court thus concludes that there is a common law and a First Amendment presumption of access. Id. at 146; see also Nixon v. Warner Conzmc 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978). The question, then, is whether the redaction and sealing requests are narrowly tailored to se