Epstein Secrets

tion of JFK, to the forced resignation of Richard Nixon, to the Chappaquiddick investigation of Ted Kenne

his law clerk with him. In the end, Judge Bazelon was regarded as too liberal for the Kennedy Administration and was passed over for labor secretary Arthur Goldberg, who had no judicial experience, but boasted a distinguished career as a labor lawyer before he joined the Cabinet as Secretary of Labor. Bazelon and

ve to confront the ultimate issue. But it was not the same Court that had been sitting when the strategy was originally devised; there were four new Nixon appointees, and it was clear that at least some of them believed the death penalty to be constitutional. The umpires — if not the rules — had been ch

ion. This is not to suggest that justice should remain blind to the existence of a real emergency endangering the survival of the nation. As Justice Arthur Goldberg once wrote: “While the Constitution protects against the invasion of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.” But it is precisely during times o

418 4.2.12 WC: 191694 as “so proud” and so “endowed with intelligence,” but who “have in the main given their acquiescence or their support to the Nixon ethos” which has led to the death, maiming, and displacement of “some six million Southeast Asians.” Berrigan referred to the ironic figure of 6 mill

ce and opposed the arms embargo against the Jewish state. Its membership over the years has included such distinguished lawyers as Thurgood Marshall, Arthur Goldberg, Ferdinand Pecora, Paul O’Dwyer, Louis Boudin, and William Hastie. During its early years, splits developed between the anti-Communist liberals and t