Epstein Secrets

r in the Executive Branch not to indict ... has long been regarded as [within] the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' " (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3)). This Executive Bra

ates in their control over criminal prosecutions. Id. (quoting United States v. Cox. 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965)); accord. e.g.. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821. 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) ("gyre decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict ... has long been r

resolution of this petition for a writ of mandamus would not change. Moreover, ow opinion about pre-charge *1272 rights would not be binding on the Executive in the same way that the opinions about pension requests were not binding in? I He/Aunts Case. B. We Construe Statutes by Reading the Whole Text,

ons, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney ....'); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 1656, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) r[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict ... has lon

ing decisions, the choice to resolve a case through a non-prosecution agreement or a deferred prosecution agreement “resides fundamentally with the Executive” branch. Id. at 741. OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard in the USAM prohibiting the use of a non- prosecution agreement in the circumsta

ection be available for the decision not to charge.” Id. at 41 (emphasis in original). Finally, in an analogous area of the law, in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the Supreme Court concluded that an agency’s decision not to undertake an enforcement action is not reviewable under the fede