Epstein Secrets

A00209852 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead." Slip op. at 6.I In Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mens rea requirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful

o Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

mize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oldnonexcut.

sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute is guided "

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

mize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/nonexcut

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olcinonexcut