Epstein Secrets

A00209852 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead." Slip op. at 6.I In Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mens rea requirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful

o Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

diction is necessary. See Tab 11, November 9, 2007 Letter from Justice Department Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian Benczkowski to the House Committee on the Judiciary, p. 8-9. 3 08-80736-CV-MARRA RFP WPB 001672 EFTA00209851 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Summon of the Law We have reviewed every repor

sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a federal criminal statute is guided "

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

diction is necessary. See Tab 11, November 9, 2007 Letter from Justice Department Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian Benczkowski to the House Committee on the Judiciary, p. 8-9. 3 EFTA00210076 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Summary of the Law We have reviewed every reported case under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591,

it is not in accord with the principles of justice. Indeed, as noted, just a few weeks ago, the Supreme Court underscored this point in Santos and Cuellar. The Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion does not provide the USAO cart blanche to expand criminal statutes as they seek to do here with

upreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those enacted to protect important fede

hat Federal jurisdiction is necessary. See Tab 11, November 9, 2007 Letter from Justice Department Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General to the House Committee on the Judiciary, p. 8-9. 3 3505-019 Page 49 of 63 SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER PARAGRAPHS 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, and 17 EFTA_00003321 EFTA00157703