Epstein Secrets

atement reveals how inapposite a federal prosecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court's very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court's interpretive methodology when it comes to federal

erson ..."). § 2423(b) is not such a statute. Federal court decisions watering down the "for the purpose of " requi ment fly in the face of the two Suprems Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen'. Huff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934); Mortensen. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak l

uch usurpation does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http:

sidents have provided advance notice of their intention not to enforce specific statutory requirements that they have viewed as unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed this practice. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983) (noting that Presidents often sign legislation containing con

nconstitutional limitation on the President's removal power. Myers is particularly instructive because, at the time President Wilson acted, there was no Supreme Court precedent on point and the statute was not manifestly unconstitutional. In fact, the constitutionality of restrictions on the President's authority t

ch a provision, can be a valid and reasonable exercise of Presidential authority." Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 4 (Nov. 3, 1993). (Of course, the President is not obligated to announce his reservations in

ions—a description used by CEOS itself—it cannot be shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as

uch usurpation does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http:

tatement reveals how inapposite a federal prosecution is to the facts in this case. Importantly, we note that the CEOS review was conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s very recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar, which we believe—illuminating as they do the Court’s interpretive methodology when it comes to federal c

such usurpation does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://