ation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole perio

n, but it now appears that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus the only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw the plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole period," suc

(holding that complete rescission of plea agreement was only permissible remedy when defendant was induced to enter plea based on mistake of law); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 966 (Colo. 1990) (noting that if plea was induced by illegal promise, proper remedy was defendant's option to withdraw from plea agr

v. 25 EFTA00178081 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 77 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/02/2011 Page 26 of 29 Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (le Cir. 1995); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999)). The Government, however, seeks to escape from the general rule that illegal plea arrangements can be invalidat

ation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole perio

ation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole perio

n, but it now appears that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus the only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw the plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole period," suc

n, but it now appears that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus the only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw the plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole period," suc

resent here, that a court cannot enforce facially invalid plea agreements that contain illegal terms or omit the required components of a sentence. Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (court cannot enforce a plea 28 EFTA00299048 agreement that waives the mandatory parole period); State v. Garc

equitable claim Epstein has for specific performance of the non-prosecution agreement disappears. Other cases reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole peri

ation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Cob. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole period

ation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole perio

y erroneous construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3858(b) — and where rescission "would [have] restore[d] the defendant to the approximate status quo ante"); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60, 961-93 (Colo. 1999) (holding that plea agreement made no unlawful promises, but concluding that court would not have been req

y erroneous construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3858(b) — and where rescission "would [have] restore[d] the defendant to the approximate status quo ante"); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60, 961-93 (Colo. 1999) (holding that plea agreement made no unlawful promises, but concluding that court would not have been req

y erroneous construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3858(b) — and where rescission "would [have] restore[d] the defendant to the approximate status quo ante"); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60, 961-93 (Colo. 1999) (holding that plea agreement made no unlawful promises, but concluding that court would not have been req

ation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole perio

y erroneous construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3858(b) — and where rescission "would [have] restore[d] the defendant to the approximate status quo ante"); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60, 961-93 (Colo. 1999) (holding that plea agreement made no unlawful promises, but concluding that court would not have been req