e 9/11. It might sound from these citations that the 9/11 Commission marked a new stage in the U.S. treatment of these

ers, whose presence in the United States was concealed from the FBI by CIA officers for months before 9/11. It might sound from these citations that the 9/11 Commission marked a new stage in the U.S. treatment of these terrorists, and that the report now exposed those terrorists who in the past had been protected. On

dmarks in New York City, their fatwas against Americans, the criminal indictment against them arising from the Nairobi attack, and the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission). As a result, their “decision to purposefully direct their terror at the United States, and the fact that the plaintiffs’ injuries arose out of one

es. Prior to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, “stovepiping” had protected NSA data on its computers from networks used by other intelligence services. After the 9/11 Commission concluded that part of the reason U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to “connect the dots” in advance of the attack was related to this practice,

attack in 2001, NSA data had been protected by “stove-piping” that separated NSA’ computers from networks used by other intelligence services. After the 9/11 Commission concluded that part of the reason why US intelligence agencies were unable to “connect the dots” in advance of the attack was because this “stove-pip

91, 7867. ea JA3827-28, 3866-67, 4465-66. a 9/11 Commission Final Report, pp. 169-170. aa JA3785-86. eet JA3710-14, 3845, 3870-71, 4394-4402. ES 9/11 Commission Monograph on Terrorist Financing, available at www.9-11commission.gov/staff.../911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf. a JA4394-95, 5982-83, 6212-13. WESTLAW HO