Epstein Secrets

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing