Epstein Secrets

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

(3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The distric