Epstein Secrets

of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congre

ively by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pm-trial production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(bX1)(A), (C), and 16(bX2); United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production privilege). Th

not subject to a Court's discretion. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congre

ively by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pre-trial production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(b)(1)(A), (C), and 16(bX2); United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production privilege). T

S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). The word "shall" means that the statute's command is mandatory and not subject to a Court's discretion. See, e.g., Lopez' Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc

ively by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pre-trial production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(b)(1)(A), (C), and 16(b)(2); United States I Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production privilege). T