Epstein Secrets

ved, if the talks were going to have a chance. In the end, the Americans settled on a beautiful, and undeniably remote, town in West Virginia called Shepherdstown. But from the outset, I was worried it couldn’t provide the kind of environment we needed. As soon as our plane landed at Andrews Air Force base outs

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

attraction in getting a deal with Syria first: it would increase our negotiating leverage with the Palestinians. That would certainly not be lost on Yasir Arafat — one reason that I realized the importance of an early meeting with him, to convey my commitment to keeping the Oslo process alive, and, if possible

eved, if the talks were going to have a chance. In the end, the Americans settled on a beautiful, and undeniably remote, town in West Virginia called Shepherdstown. But from the outset, I was worried it couldn't provide the kind of environment we needed. As soon as our plane landed at Andrews Air Force base outs

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

54 Chapter Twenty-One President Clinton and I met the next morning. My aim was to persuade him that the time had come for a make-or-break summit with Yasir Arafat. I suspected it would not be easy to convince him, and it wasn't. But I made the argument that if we were to have any hope of moving Oslo forward, we

process, described it, with only a little hyperbole, as "a wacko agenda that bordered on the megalomaniacal." The history of how it went wrong, in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, with the Syrians and at Camp David with Yasir Arafat, has been written and rewritten countless times from all perspectives. There i

for the talks' collapse, but most analysts put at least some on Barak -- for his waffling (with the Syrians) and his haste and highhandedness (with Arafat). If the causes are disputable, however, the consequences are not. Instead of peace coming to the Middle East, the Syrian track stalled and the Pal

a that bordered on the megalomaniacal." The history of how it went wrong, in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, with the Syrians and at Camp David with Yasir Arafat, has been written and rewritten countless times from all perspectives. There is no clear consensus on who bears the lion's share of the blame for t

ement) (28 September 1995) 145 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH Agreement) (9 May 1996) 324 Declaration by PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat following their first meeting (4 September 1996) 327 Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) 329 Note for the Record (17 January 1997) 336 HOUSE_OVERSIGH

President Clinton hosts summit meeting with Israel’s Prime Minister Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara, followed by rounds of peace talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in January 2000. 5 March 2000 Government of Israel’s resolution to withdraw from Lebanon. 26 March 2000 Bill Clinton and Hafez al-A