Epstein Secrets

militarily, but it might well be driven to forge a stronger strategic partnership with China, which also opposes foreign military interventions in the Middle East and has joined Russia in vetoing UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. China has been ambivalent in the past about Russian overtures to ally ag

tical and economic support. And the search for water is already one of the driving forces of the wave of deals by some major emerging economies and Arab Gulf states to secure land for agricultural production overseas. Meanwhile, new producers are seeking to restrict the market in key resources in order

a act on its commitment to support NATO's missile defense project by placing radars on its territory. Turkey, anchored in NATO and oriented toward the Middle East, is a greater threat to Iranian interests than the merely pro- EFTA_R1_00229098 EFTA01842297 Western Turkey of a decade ago. There is a chance tha

ort, despite the dispute over the Assad regime. If the Gaza leadership is to mount an effective pushback against this new initiative, which enjoys Arab Gulf backing, it is going to require significant support from Iran. The Iranians might have incentives to continue to fund Hamas in Gaza to try to sabot

egional primacy - even, perhaps, of hegemony - to be attained through fanning rising Sunni militancy [1] and Salafist acculturation. At least seven Middle Eastern states are now beset by bitter, and increasingly violent, power struggles; states such as Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen are dismantling.

te debt. Desperate for cash, the government issued "diaspora bonds" last March in an attempt to tap into the savings of the Egyptian expats in the Arab Gulf region. Though no official figures have been released, proceeds from the sales so far seem to fall very short of the $2 billion the government had

fter it draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's also likely dead wrong. What is true, however, is that political and military trajectories in the Middle East and South Asia are likely to increasingly challenge U.S. contingency access in the coming decade. The ability for the United States to surge large-sc

n the region at the same time as they supported it in backroom dealings, quietly authorizing facilities support and air, land, and sea access. But if Arab Gulf states were quietly supportive in the past, their opposition to American military force is likely to grow in the future. They read the aftermath of t