Epstein Secrets

ly manageable for the Arabs and the West. Now all of that is gone. Within a year -- a stunningly inconsequential unit of time in the grand sweep of Middle Eastern history -- these three Arab states have gone off line. In the case of Iraq, this has been in the works for some time now. EFTA_R1_00229384 EFTA018

markets should enable firms to reap greater economies of scale, increase returns to investment and adopt more new technology. Just as important in the Middle Eastern context, more open trade would begin the process of dismantling over-centralised states and create a constituency for further economic change. Of

ture. Since the primary outlines of the agreement were actually negotiated during U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks held in July and October 2011 prior to Kim Jong-il's death, the agreement itself provides limited insight into how North Korea's new leadership makes decisions aside from reinforcing the North Korean

es the people agree to forego their desire to replace their leaders. (Truly, East Asian autocracies have not robbed people of their dignity the way Middle Eastern ones have.) But even as such growth rates continue unabated—to say nothing of if they collapse or even slow down—at higher income levels, this soci

lways preferable to hard ones, even if the process takes some time. A moral argument can be made that monsters like Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya and Kim Jong-il in North Korea should be overthrown any way they can, as fast as we can, regardless of the risk of short-term chaos. But that reasoning quickly lo

and stop proliferation, we will maintain pressure on both Iran and North Korea. Iran, in particular, is trying to exploit the changes sweeping across the Middle East. But the hypocrisy of claiming to support reform in other countries while suppressing it at home is obvious for all the world to see. Some believe th

is obvious for all the world to see. Some believe that the changes in the region will increase Iran’s influence. In fact the opposite will happen: in a Middle East where more citizens determine their own destiny, Iran will be increasingly isolated by its actions. Elsewhere, we will work to secure the world’s vu

ndestine programs—as if the US nuclear arsenal poses the same danger to international peace and security as do the nuclear arsenals of the regimes of Kim Jong-il or the [ranian clerics. The goal of zero nuclear weapons, often referred to by its sponsors as a “moral imperative,” inevitably delegitimizes and un

cause they unquestioningly back Israel or support Arab autocrats. Should those policies be moderated and replaced by more even-handed postures toward the Middle East, newly liberated Arab citizens would probably be too busy building their new countries to allow themselves to be distracted by lingering resentments

always preferable to hard ones, even if the process takes some time. A moral argument can be made that monsters like Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya and Kim Jong-il in North Korea should be overthrown any way they can, as fast as we can, regardless of the risk of short-term chaos. But that reasoning quickly loses