Epstein Secrets

udicial SO EFTA00299070 process," id., which prohibits "parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). "Stated simply, the doctrine of judicial estoppel rests on the principle that "absent any good explanation,

econd-guess the Executive's exercise of discretion over the initiation and dismissal of criminal charges." Id. at 738. 45 EFTA00299065 Although Fokker addressed DPAs, the same principles apply with even greater to force to NPAs, which typically involve no judicial supervision. By imposing the Epste

Accordingly, judicial authority is "at its most limited when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over charging determinations." Id. In Fokker, the question before the D.C. Circuit was whether the district court had the power to decline to enter a speedy trial waiver because it believed tha

ir. 2002) (citation omitted). Judicial estoppel prohibits "parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire I. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). The Eleventh Circuit has identified three factors to be considered in determining whether to apply the equit

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The 11 EFTA00211728 As to the third time period, when the Government found out on Friday, June 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15

ir. 2002) (citation omitted). Judicial estoppel prohibits "parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). The Eleventh Circuit has identified three factors to be considered in determining whether to apply the equit

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The II EFTA00799835 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 408 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/06/2017 Page 12 of 32 As to the third time p

ir. 2002) (citation omitted). Judicial estoppel prohibits "parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). The Eleventh Circuit has identified three factors to be considered in determining whether to apply the equit

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The 11 EFTA00591472 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 401-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/02/2017 Page 13 of 33 As to the third tim

a party's later inconsistent position introduces no risk of inconsistent court determinations and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742,750-51 (2001). The victims never had "success" in arguing that Epstein was estopped from denying that he has abused the vict

s. To be sure, judicial authority is limited "when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over charging determinations." United States v. Fokker Servs. B. V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016). But Jane Doe 1 and 2 are not asking this Court to review any prosecutor's ultimate charging deter