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a WikiLeaks cable that brilliantly foreshadowed how environmental stresses would fuel the uprising. Sent on Nov. 8, 2008, from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus to the State Department, the cable details how, in light of what was a devastating Syrian drought — it lasted from 2006-10 — Syria's U.N. food and
ns are best left to the Syrian people, even as it dispatches Iranian forces to Syria, sends arms EFTA00651255 to the Assad regime in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and orchestrates the presence of thousands of pro-regime fighters in Syria. AVOIDING TRAPS ON THE LONG DIPLOMATIC ROAD AHEAD The mech
e moderate because they bore the brunt of economic boycotts and military clashes with Israel. Exiled Hamas bosses living in the relative comfort of Damascus, however, could afford to take a tougher stance. But the "Arab Spring" has turned the equation on its head, with longtime hard-liners who had resid
the West should stand firm. Russia cannot be allowed to veto America's missile-defence plans in Europe. Nor should Mr Putin's continued blocking of UN Security Council resolutions authorising intervention in Syria be treated as an insurmountable bar to action, any more than it was in Kosovo in 1999. G20 leaders sh
reas Hamas, repositioning itself in internal Palestinian politics following the Fatah-Hamas unity government agreement and the closing of the Hamas Damascus office, has much to lose in a military confrontation with Israel. Syria: The March 21 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Syria, approved
ty government agreement and the closing of the Hamas Damascus office, has much to lose in a military confrontation with Israel. Syria: The March 21 UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Syria, approved by all 15 Council members, sends a strong and united message from the international community. The non- bi
a WikiLeaks cable that brilliantly foreshadowed how environmental stresses would fuel the uprising. Sent on Nov. 8, 2008, from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus to the State Department, the cable details how, in light of what was a devastating Syrian drought — it lasted from 2006-10 — Syria's U.N. food and
t such decisions are best left to the Syrian people, even as it dispatches Iranian forces to Syria, sends arms to the Assad regime in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and orchestrates the presence of thousands of pro-regime fighters in Syria. AVOIDING TRAPS ON THE LONG DIPLOMATIC ROAD AHEAD The me
ants to topple the pro-Iranian al Assad does not mean it would be pleased with an EFTA00712375 extended situation in which nobody is in charge in Damascus. The Israeli viewpoint is similar. The Shiite government in Iraq fears Sunni terrorists being given free rein in the Syrian border area. As for the
h Iran. Inside the administration, few if any officials actually believe that sanctions will work as intended, namely, to force Iran to comply with UN Security Council resolutions that demand a stop to enrichment. Since 2009, President Obama has opposed, deflected, and tried to weaken sanctions legislation enacted
Entities connected to both Damascus and UN Security Council

Barack Obama
PERSON
Bashar al-Assad
PERSON
Lebanon
LOCATION
United States
LOCATION
George W. Bush
PERSON
Bill Clinton
PERSON
Tehran
LOCATION
Benjamin Netanyahu
PERSON
Tunisia
LOCATION
Hosni Mubarak
PERSON
Hillary Clinton
PERSON
Terje Rod-Larsen
PERSON
Cairo
LOCATION
Vladimir Putin
PERSON
Yemen
LOCATION
Saddam Hussein
PERSON
Middle East
LOCATION
Fatah
ORGANIZATION
Marc Rich
PERSON
Department of Justice
ORGANIZATION