Epstein Secrets

anonymity, it was assumed that, according to the plan, the regime would continue its cooperation with Hezbollah to gain control of the outskirts of Damascus, via a battle in eastern and western Ghouta, as well as through beginning another battle in the Qalamoun region. The latter is adjacent to the Leb

ring on its promises to Syrians, organisers say. In Morocco, a local Tamarod campaign began with the call to bring down the Islamist government of the Justice and Development Party, and is finding support from people across the political spectrum. EFTA00678461

ian point of view, this is a crisis. From a national-interest point of view, it is an opportunity to undermine enemies of the United States in both Damascus and Tehran. But President Obama has treated the bloody turmoil, first and foremost, as an opportunity to strengthen the idea that America should su

ay for a political party that would be conservatively religious but not outright Islamist. In 2001, Erdogan seized the moment, forming a new party, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP. The AKP, according to Balci, contrasted with its Islamist precursors EFTA00701894 in two key respects: it was highly internationalist, a

pose an ideology that Hafez al-Assad didn't much care for, in exchange for military and intelligence assistance that Syria couldn't do without. But Damascus isn't just a resurrected strategic ally following years of desuetude under the Yeltsin government; it is Putin's last-stand client in the region ag

g the terms "Kurdistan" and "Kurt cografyasi." Galip Ensarioglu, himself a Kurd, a member of Diyarbakir's business class and a mayoral candidate on the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) ticket, also stated on Dec. 3 that he "would not hesitate to call every territory where Kurds live `Kurdistan.' I myself am Kurdish as w

purpose to his consistently regressive interference in world affairs. That nobody is surprised at his obdurate defense of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus speaks volumes. Dictators support dictators, don't they? At this point Mr. Putin apparently doesn't mind much that anyone should include him in th

This promised to transfer real (though not all) powers to a freely and fairly elected government. Within a year he accepted an electoral triumph by the Justice and Development Party (or PJD, after its French initials), a mildly Islamist group. The PJD has discarded its predecessors' hierarchical ways. Its leader, Mr Benkirane,

purpose to his consistently regressive interference in world affairs. That nobody is surprised at his obdurate defense of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus speaks volumes. Dictators support dictators, don't they? At this point Mr. Putin apparently doesn't mind much that anyone should include him in th

his promised to transfer real (though not all) powers to a freely and fairly elected government. Within a year he accepted an electoral triumph by the Justice and Development Party (or PJD, after its French initials), a mildly Islamist group. The PJD has discarded its predecessors' hierarchical ways. Its leader, Mr Benkirane,

rity — begin. As a result, most Alawites are rallying to Assad, as are some Sunnis who have benefitted from his regime, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus, the capital. These pro-regime Alawites and Sunnis see the chaos and soccer riots in Egypt and say to themselves: "Assad or chaos? We'll take Assad

ng nation-state, leaving a vacuum in the Middle East. In the past decade, though, Turkey's economic growth and emergence as a regional giant under the Justice and Development Party, or A.K.P., have revived its standing. From the Syrian uprising to EFTA_R1_00229096 EFTA01842295 Iraq's sectarian convulsions to Iran's push for

ding joint cabinet meetings and talking about spearheading a common market in the Middle East. Then the Arab wave EFTA00713328 of reforms reached Damascus. The relationship turned hostile as the Syrian leadership resisted reforms and engaged in large-scale massacres to subdue the opposition. With the

response to this threat would certainly have been for the Turkish body politic to finally and permanently address Turkey's own Kurdish problem. But the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership's prevailing populist tendencies seem to preclude this option despite a well-intentioned effort undertaken before the 2011 electio