Epstein Secrets

ts new vision of its national interest," he said, suggesting that this explained "the non-response by strikes to the use of chemical weapons by the Damascus regime, whatever the red lines set a year earlier." He went on to say this U.S. redirection seemed likely to be "durable," reflecting the "heavy t

e Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the City College of New York/City University of New York, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and the author, most recently, of The End of Alliances (Oxford University Press, 2007). NYT French Muscle, American Cheese Roger Cohen Novemb

pose an ideology that Hafez al-Assad didn't much care for, in exchange for military and intelligence assistance that Syria couldn't do without. But Damascus isn't just a resurrected strategic ally following years of desuetude under the Yeltsin government; it is Putin's last-stand client in the region ag

resuscitate Idriss' Free Syrian Army, seeking a rapprochement with the Islamic Front and working to keep diplomatic talks alive. Frederic C. Hof of the Atlantic Council, another Syria expert, calls that "the moonwalk option" — the illusion of forward motion while standing in place — and it's the most likely outcome

, whose regime has reportedly killed more than 1,100 opponents since March, Turkey and Syria have established close relations. In 2009, Ankara and Damascus signed a strategic cooperation agreement, conducted joint military exercises, and launched military industrial cooperation. They also introduced vi

l framework for stabilizing Afghanistan as America withdraws troops. America had close alliances during the Cold War, but Fred Kempe, president of the Atlantic Council, notes that the partnership was often contentious. In his just-published book, "Berlin 1961," Kempe notes that President John F. Kennedy had to cop