Epstein Secrets

l UN team, among them Fabrice Aidan, on my way to Damascus for a new round of talks with the President. Midw

September 2011) 559 President Abbas’s Speech to UN General Assembly on Palestine’s Membership (23 September 2011) 562

eement. 27 April 1949 Opening of the Lausanne Conference convened by the United Nations’ Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP). 11 May 1949 The UN General Assembly admits Israel as UN member state through Resolution A/RES/273 (IID. 20 July 1949 Syria-Israel General Armistice Agreement. 12 December 1949 UN Gene

ing began more than a year ago, few predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter toward collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appears inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see similarities

ntains its qualitative military edge, to fighting back against delegitimization of Israel, whether at the [UN] Human Rights Council, or in front of the UN General Assembly, or during EFTA00719566 the Goldstone Report, or after the flare-up involving the flotilla -- the truth of the matter is that the relationship ha

at=least until recently, it is Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime ministe=. Iran's appeal has been tainted by the brutal tactics of its allies, in=Damascus and Beirut, who may remain strong materially but have lost out in=terms of image and ideas. The long-term decline of the Islamic Republic in the Mi

Nuclear Breakout Options Thomas Saetherchttp://nationalinterest.org/profile/thomas-saether> EFTA_R1_01401465 EFTA02384038 October 21, 2013 -- In the UN General Assembly on October 1, Israeli prime =inister Benjamin Netanyahu described Iran's strategy as to retain "suffi=ient nuclear material and sufficient nuclear i

uch less fulfilled, notwithstanding administration pronouncements that the eleven-country "Geneva process" will effect a governmental transition in Damascus. The Atlantic Council's Fred Hof has posed asuestion that many Syrians are surely asking as well: has the US made Bashar al-Assad "an irreplaceabl

7180 Any confusion about Israel's overriding security preoccupation should have been dispelled by Prime Minister Netanyahu's October 1 address to the UN General Assembly. While pledging his readiness to make "an historic compromise with our Palestinian neighbors," Mr. Netanyahu spent the majority of his speech artic

sing began more than a year ago, =ew predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter tow=rd collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appe=rs inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see sim=larities

he Israeli people, and to the pro-Israel communi=y in this country, since I came into office. It's hard for me to be cleare= than I was in front of the UN General Assembly, when I made a more full-throated defense of Israel and i=s legitimate security concerns than any president in history -- not, by th= way, in front

96 The first objection is that there is no clear strategy for intervention. Do we want foreign armies to destroy Assad's war machine and march on Damascus? The answer must be no. The intervention needed would be aimed at two precise objectives. The first is to enforce the arms embargo already approved

ention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, later, Kosovo: to stop genocide. In both cases, the UN was paralyzed by the threat of a Russian veto. Addressing the UN General Assembly in 1999, then Secretary- General Kofi Annan offered a reflection on the genocide in Rwanda: "If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the gen

76. It was not a warm relationship, but it was predictable, particularly in the 1990s: Israel allowed Syria a free hand in Lebanon in exchange for Damascus limiting Hezbollah's actions. Lebanon was not exactly stable, but its instability hewed to a predictable framework. That understanding broke down w

specially, Barak laying the foundation for a potential strike. Some might argue that Israeli leaders are trying to exert pressure on Obama prior to the UN General Assembly meeting in September to push him to go even further in threatening military action by publicly presenting US red lines and committing to attacking

n September on independence. They will prevail in the General Assembly, though not in the Security Council. President Ba

apostates. Hamas, in contrast, does not call for the overthrow of Arab regimes and works with Shiite Iran and the Alawite-dominated secular regime in Damascus, pragmatically preferring weapons, money, and assistance in training to ideological consistency. Hamas, like its parent organization, the Muslim Bro

rkey and Israel have been suspended. Turkey will not recognize the Gaza HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_024999 --- PAGE BREAK --- blockade and will take action at the UN General Assembly to make sure that the matter is discussed in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). And finally, Turkey will extend full support to the families o

takia for some time. Elaraby: When I flew to Syria 10 days after taking office, they also tried to tell me that there had been no riots in Aleppo or Damascus. I was told that gun battles had only occurred in a few towns near the border, because rebels had fired on security forces there. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_02