Epstein Secrets

d others are pinching Mr. Assad's cronies. But they are not enough. A United Nations arms embargo — Russia and Iran are both still selling arms to Damascus — and the toughest possible comprehensive economic sanctions are long overdue. So are formal charges against Mr. Assad and his lieutenants for crim

pular demonstrations by any means it chooses, including the kinds of crimes against humanity, indeed near-genocide, that Vladimir Putin ordered in Chechnya at the turn of the century. Kissinger claimed that the Russian and Chinese governments are upholding the foundations of a world order that the Unit

pose an ideology that Hafez al-Assad didn't much care for, in exchange for military and intelligence assistance that Syria couldn't do without. But Damascus isn't just a resurrected strategic ally following years of desuetude under the Yeltsin government; it is Putin's last-stand client in the region ag

nemies. In 2004, Russian secret agents assassinated Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, a warlord and vice president of the EFTA00706395 breakaway republic of Chechnya, as he ferried his 13-year-old son down the streets of Doha and away from the mosque where they had just participated in Friday prayers. An intense

purpose to his consistently regressive interference in world affairs. That nobody is surprised at his obdurate defense of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus speaks volumes. Dictators support dictators, don't they? At this point Mr. Putin apparently doesn't mind much that anyone should include him in th

strongmen. Less than 10 years before he ordered the 2008 invasion of Georgia in order to "protect" the separatist South Ossetians, he "solved" the Chechnya problem by ordering the scorched-earth obliteration of its capital, Grozny, where more civilians were killed than at Sreberniza and Homs combined.

purpose to his consistently regressive interference in world affairs. That nobody is surprised at his obdurate defense of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus speaks volumes. Dictators support dictators, don't they? At this point Mr. Putin apparently doesn't mind much that anyone should include him in th

strongmen. Less than 10 years before he ordered the 2008 invasion of Georgia in order to "protect" the separatist South Ossetians, he "solved" the Chechnya problem by ordering the scorched-earth obliteration of its capital, Grozny, where more civilians were killed than at Sreberniza and Horns combined

rity — begin. As a result, most Alawites are rallying to Assad, as are some Sunnis who have benefitted from his regime, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus, the capital. These pro-regime Alawites and Sunnis see the chaos and soccer riots in Egypt and say to themselves: "Assad or chaos? We'll take Assad

ons to deal with. That has been a fundamental premise throughout the Soviet /Russian existence. Can you give a recent example? Yes. In the case of Chechnya, the Russians were extremely nervous during the initial phases of that war [1994-1996] that there'd be some sort of UN resolution that argued for a

table, at best. The protests started in mid-March in Daraa, in southern Syria, a city that has suffered from drought and neglect by the government in Damascus. The heavy hand of the ruling Baath party was particularly resented. Because it lies on the border with Jordan, and therefore in a security zone, all

hat foreigners have the right to intervene to prevent human rights abuses in a sovereign nation. The same goes for the Russians, with their record in Chechnya. India, Brazil and South Africa are democratic countries with no need for a contingency plan to shoot their own citizens. But their colonial historie