Epstein Secrets

cross the Jordan River, in a town called Karameh. From early 1968, they had been launching hit- and-run raids, not just on the West Bank but into the Negev. Eshkol’s cabinet was initially divided on whether to attack his base in Jordan, in both an act of retaliation and a signal to King Hussein that if h

the parachutists of 150 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011621 Battalion 890, under Yitzhik Mordechai, were in trouble. “Go. Find them. Help get them out.” I knew Yitzhik personally, from his years in the paratroopers’ elite Battalion 890. I knew the man who was now in overall command of the paratroopers even better: U

enik. Immediately behind us were our APCs, including two carrying our medical team. My aim was to engage the Egyptian fire while starting to evacuate Yitzhik’s men to one of the long, dry, irrigation ditches, 600 yards behind us. We moved forward in a broad line with my command tank in the center. We held

rrowest of margins, might determine the outcome. After the 1996 election, I’d learned of cases where Peres volunteers outside polling stations in the Negev or the north of the country had left early, in order to make sure they’d be back to Tel Aviv in time for the “moment of victory.” Now, I sent out wor

o senior ministers directly affected: Arik Sharon, who had replaced David Levy as Foreign Minister; and Yitzhik Mordechai. Both of them said no, with Yitzhik pointing out that a signed map would inevitably become part of the negotiating record. It was a step that, in future negotiations, could not be undon

election, I had a surprise visitor, someone I knew from Yitzhik Mordecai’s team. He said he had a letter for me, with terms of a proposal under which Yitzhik would announce an eleventh-hour withdrawal from the race. I still could not be absolutely confident I’d win, at least in the first round. Yitzhik’s p

cross the Jordan River, in a town called Karameh. From early 1968, they had been launching hit- and-run raids, not just on the West Bank but into the Negev. Eshkol's cabinet was initially divided on whether to attack his base in Jordan, in both an act of retaliation and a signal to King Hussein that if h

the parachutists of 150 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_027998 Battalion 890, under Yitzhik Mordechai, were in trouble. "Go. Find them. Help get them out." I knew Yitzhik personally, from his years in the paratroopers' elite Battalion 890. I knew the man who was now in overall command of the paratroopers even better: U

enik. Immediately behind us were our APCs, including two carrying our medical team. My aim was to engage the Egyptian fire while starting to evacuate Yitzhik's men to one of the long, dry, irrigation ditches, 600 yards behind us. We moved forward in a broad line with my command tank in the center. We held

rrowest of margins, might determine the outcome. After the 1996 election, I'd learned of cases where Peres volunteers outside polling stations in the Negev or the north of the country had left early, in order to make sure they'd be back to Tel Aviv in time for the "moment of victory." Now, I sent out wor

o senior ministers directly affected: Arik Sharon, who had replaced David Levy as Foreign Minister; and Yitzhik Mordechai. Both of them said no, with Yitzhik pointing out that a signed map would inevitably become part of the negotiating record. It was a step that, in future negotiations, could not be undon

election, I had a surprise visitor, someone I knew from Yitzhik Mordecai's team. He said he had a letter for me, with terms of a proposal under which Yitzhik would announce an eleventh-hour withdrawal from the race. I still could not be absolutely confident I'd win, at least in the first round. Yitzhik's p