Epstein Secrets

into smaller units that would then be more reliant on foreign support or protection. Sudan has already split into northern and southern states, while Yemen, Iraq and possibly a few others are similarly susceptible to subdivision into smaller statelets. This raises difficult issues about the inviolability

ld mostly rejoiced when the former Soviet Union and its empire collapsed and some of its constituent republics fragmented into smaller units, notably Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. We should be prepared to deal with the specter of existing Arab countries that reconfigure their frontiers and populations while

nal rivals, chiefly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have responded with more direct foreign interventions of their own, most notably in Yemen. The recent embrace of more overtly repressive policies stems in part from the common structural flaws of the modern authoritarian model. The ques

ble. But would the general decline in military budgets hold? Would the new national boundaries that divided the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia be sustainable? As modern authoritarianism has taken root and ex- panded its influence, the answers to these questions are increasingly negative.

hom? The obvious answer is Iran, Saudi's great regional rival, or one of the three states that the Saudis are most concerned about — Syria, Iraq or Yemen. And it will not have escaped Tehran's notice that the CSS-2 ballistic missiles that Riyadh paraded for the first time last week can easily reach

h must have been a Palestinian. Nor have ethnic loyalties always matched political boundaries. Even after the violent dismemberment of multiethnic Yugoslavia, none of the successor states can claim to be wholly homogeneous. Ethnic minorities in Slovenia and Serbia (even with the exclusion of Albanian Kos

strike aircraft, and UAVs) has profoundly influenced the U.S. approach to targeting violent extremist networks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. ENUAVs and robotics.Israel is a pioneer in the development and use of UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat, and Israeli

UAVs and the conduct of an integrated air-defense suppression campaign were applied in subsequent U.S. operations over Libya, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia. And lessons learned from the 2000-2005 intifada and the 2008-2009 Israeli incursion into Gaza regarding counterterrorist operations, urban warfare,

um seekers from countries of "special concern" (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, North Korea, China, Pakistan, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia) as potential national security risks. Some argue further that — since asylum is a discretionary form of immigration relief— national s

of all the 234,590 refugees, asylees and humanitarian entrants who became LPRs: Bosnia-Herzegovina (20%), Cuba (20%), Ukraine (8%), and the former Yugoslavia (7%) 6 Although there are many who would revise U.S. asylum law and policy, those advocating change have divergent perspectives. Some express conce

o smaller units that would then be more reliant on foreign support or protection. Sudan has already split into northern and southern states, while Yemen, Iraq and possibly a few others are similarly susceptible to subdivision into smaller statelets. This raises difficult issues about the inviolabili

mostly rejoiced when the former Soviet Union and its empire collapsed and some of its constituent republics fragmented into smaller units, notably Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. We should be prepared to deal with the specter of existing Arab countries that reconfigure their frontiers and populations whil

s liberals need to organise fast in response and to prepare for elections. As for the west, it cannot afford to let the dramas in Libya, Syria and Yemen lead to the neglect of Egypt. For the fate of the Arab Spring still hangs most of all on what happens in the most populous and culturally powerful

rom these countries are not too different from the images that came out of Bosnia at the time of the Serbian Chetniks attacks during the breakup of Yugoslavia. The people in the cities under siege or under attack in Libya and Syria are, in the final analysis, as defenseless as the people of Gaza, who suf

ightening of the Russia-Iran-Syria-Iraq alignment that threatens to surround the Sunni oil producers, underlined by last year' spread of the war to Yemen. The EU' s expansive effort to pull Ukraine into its sphere has been resisted by Russian military force, and there is Russian pushback for the ret

and cultures due to the horrors and ethnic cleansings during and after the war. This is likewise partly true of the successor states to the former Yugoslavia. They all signed on enthusiastically to the European project in expectation of sharing the bounty of European prosperity, governance institutions,

rable. But would the general decline in military budgets hold? Would the new national boundaries that divided the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia be sustainable? As modern authoritarianism has taken root and ex- panded its influence, the answers to these questions are increasingly negative. 1

gional rivals, chiefly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have responded with more direct foreign interventions of their own, most notably in Yemen. The recent embrace of more overtly repressive policies stems in part from the common structural flaws of the modern authoritarian model. The questi

r pathetic cluelessness about the forces we do so much to promote. The Arab Spring is turning into a long, hot summer. Civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen and the sullen silence of the Shi'a in Bahrain have baptized Arab democracy in blood. More will flow — and American foreign policy is befuddled and b

mptions can lead you into as much trouble this quickly. Even in 1989-90, those countries were the exception and not the rule. Think Ukraine, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Romania, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and of course Russia itself. More people live in countries where the 1989-90 revolutionary wave failed t